### 1

#### Intepretation – restrictions must be statutory.

Gerald Hill 12, The People’s Law Dictionary, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1835

Restriction

n. any limitation on activity, by statute, regulation or contract provision. In multi-unit real estate developments, condominium and cooperative housing projects managed by homeowners' associations or similar organizations, such organizations are usually required by state law to impose restrictions on use. Thus, the restrictions are part of the "covenants, conditions and restrictions" intended to enhance the use of common facilities and property which are recorded and incorporated into the title of each owner.

#### Violation – there are no statutory restrictions on the OCS

Kathleen Gramp and Jeff LaFave, CBO Budget Analysis Division, August 2012, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12\_Oil-and-Gas\_Leasing.pdf

Other than the temporary ban on leasing in the eastern Gulf of Mexico, there currently are no statutory restrictions on OCS leasing. Decisions about leasing are made administratively—in consultation with industry and the states—for five-year periods. Leases cannot be offered for areas that are not included in a five-year plan, but the available regions may change whenever a new plan is adopted. The next plan is expected to go into effect in August 2012 and will extend for five years unless a future Administration chooses to restart the process before that plan expires.

#### Prefer it – binding the aff to restrictions on the books is key to predictable research burden and neg ground. Voter for education and fairness.

### 2

#### CIR will pass this year---Obama building momentum

The Hill 3/25 (Justin Sink and Meghashyam Mali, “Obama: 'The time has come' to move immigration reform in Congress,”

http://thehill.com/video/administration/290129-obama-the-time-has-come-to-move-immigration-reform)

Obama said he expects debate on an immigration bill to “begin next month” at a ceremony where 28 people, including 13 armed servicemembers, became citizens. Bipartisan groups in both the House and Senate are moving closer to unveiling separate immigration reform proposals, and the president is hoping to build momentum for a deal. “We've known for years that our immigration system is broken, that we're not doing enough to harness the talent and ingenuity of all those who want to work hard and find a place in America,” Obama said. “And after avoiding the problem for years, the time has come to fix it once and for all. The time has come for comprehensive, sensible immigration reform.” Speaking from the East Room, Obama argued that immigration strengthens the country. “It keeps us vibrant, it keeps us hungry, it keeps us prosperous. It is what makes us such a dynamic country,” he said. “If we want to keep attracting the best and the brightest, we've got to do a better job of welcoming them.” Advocates for immigration reform see a real chance for legislation to pass Congress this year, despite opposition from some House GOP lawmakers, many of whom have said they will oppose measures that grant “amnesty” to illegal immigrants and have questioned proposed protections for gay or lesbian couples. Immigration reform is a potent political issue for Obama, who won more than 70 percent of the Hispanic vote in 2012. Since that showing, a growing number of conservative lawmakers have signaled they would back immigration reform, including measures to provide a pathway to citizenship. Groups aligned with Obama have signaled their intention of pressuring Congress. On Monday, The New York Times reported that Organizing for Action — the political group born from the president's reelection campaign — will launch a new online effort featuring the stories of some 7,000 supporters, some of whom entered the country illegally. The Senate’s “Gang of Eight” introduced their framework, calling for a pathway to citizenship, heightened border security, increased high-skilled immigration and a guest worker program, in January. But since then, senators have been tied down in negotiations over the details of the plan, with many key issues still unresolved. Obama said he wanted to see debate begin on a congressional bill by April. “We are making progress, but we've got to finish the job, because this issue is not new,” Obama said. “Everyone pretty much knows what's broken, everyone knows how to fix it.”

#### **Natural gas production causes political fights**

Dicker 9/4 Daniel is a Senior Columnist at The Street. “Why Isn't Natural Gas an Election Issue?” 2012, http://www.thestreet.com/story/11684440/1/why-isnt-natural-gas-an-election-issue.html?cm\_ven=GOOGLEN

Why has this opportunity towards increased reliance on natural gas been so obvious and yet so difficult for politicians of both parties to embrace?¶ It hasn't been solely because 2012 is an election year. Boone Pickens was on CNBC last week marking the fourth anniversary of his "Pickens Plan," the failed congressional effort to invest in truck natural gas engines and fuelling infrastructure to run them on.¶ In fact, if anyone wanted to see political partisanship in action slowing the real economic progress this nation could make, they'd find no better example than the history of the Pickens plan and other natural gas initiatives in Washington.¶ Both radical wings of each party have made advocating natural gas use impossible. Democratic environmentalists are concerned about hydraulic fracturing and its possible impact to aquifers. Republicans are reluctant to approve further federal spending of any kind as well as risk a charge of "picking winners" in natural gas -- a charge they have made successfully against Democrats.¶ Of course, both radical wings of both parties are wrong: Overwhelming evidence from every independent research source has concluded that hydraulic fracturing of shale for natural gas has proven to be safe to our water supplies and is getting safer all the time.¶ Republican reticence to support natural gas expansion belies a long history of government incentives for developing new energy sources, from as far back as our development of coal to our much discussed modern tax incentives for crude oil exploration and production.¶ It is a fact that our government has been picking winners in energy for as long as there's been government.¶ The advantages of natural gas conversion and greater use are obvious but bear repeating. Natural gas is a domestic source of energy and promises energy independence here in the U.S. Production, transport and building of infrastructure for natural gas would mean millions of new jobs. Natural gas prices are literally half that of competing oil and gasoline. Finally, carbon emissions for natural gas are about a third that for coal and other fossil fuels.¶ What's not to like?¶ But it seems both radical wings of each party continue to wield enormous influence. Neither candidate has made natural gas a cornerstone of a new and necessary energy policy.

#### A shortage in STEM workers cripples US biotech leadership- thats necessary to develop countermeasures to bioterrorism

**Goldberg et al 2004** (Joseph E., Dorsey, Harry, Bartone, Paul, Ortman, Bill, Ashcraft, Paul, Burlingame, Stan, Carter, Anna L., Cofer, Robin D., Elwood, John, Guerts, Jim, Industry Studies 2004: Biotechnology, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University)

Biotechnology has the potential to revolutionize all aspects of our daily of life over the next two decades, in much the same way information technology did during the previous two decades. Biotechnology is still an immature industry that has yet to reach its full potential, but it is already an important driver for the U.S. economy overall. It presents the U.S. with a tremendous opportunity to address many of the country’s most pressing defense, health, and economic issues. It also holds promise for improvement in global health and welfare but only to the degree that other nations are willing to utilize the technology and are successful in their respective biotechnology initiatives. Biotechnology is greatly affected by government investment in basic science, government regulation, and the government product approval processes. These factors drive a unique business model. The synergy between U.S. government policies and funding, academia, and the industrial base provides the U.S. with a unique competitive advantage and is a primary reason the U.S. has been able to quickly become the global leader in biotechnology. While the recent recession temporarily cooled the rapid growth of biotech industry, it did not stifle long-term growth in revenues or sales, nor prevent sustained long-term growth. Demographics and a geometric expansion of biotech applications will fuel the biotech market well into the coming century. The U.S. is the world leader in the biotechnology industry in all aspects – the number of companies, size of the research base, number of products and patents, and level of revenue. While the U.S. is the dominant player in today’s biotechnology market, other countries in general, and Asia in particular, are actively investing in government sponsored programs to increase their market share and reduce the US dominance overall. The U.S.’ future lead in biotechnology is threatened by a potential shortage of U.S. scientists and engineers, an increasing global demand for scientists, fewer U.S. college graduates in math and science, and tighter U.S. visa restrictions on foreign students and scientists. Unfortunately, biotechnology’s potential for improving the quality of life in the U.S. and the rest of the world is tempered by the risk of enemy or terrorist use of bioagents and/or bioweapons against the US or its allies. The potential dual use of biotechnology complicates the effort to craft effective non-proliferation policies and mitigate bio-weapons threats. As biotechnology continues to mature as a technology and industrial sector, policy makers at the U.S. and global level must continue to refine global non-proliferation and counter-proliferation regimes to ensure biotechnology’s potential for mis-use does not outweigh its ability to address the world’s most pressing needs.

#### A bioweapons attack threatens human survival

**Carpenter and Bishop 2009** (P. A., P. C., July 10, Graduate Program in Studies of the Future, School of Human Sciences and Humanities, University of Houston-Clear Lake, Houston, TX, USA, Graduate Program in Futures Studies, College of Technology, University of Houston, Houston, TX, USA. A review of previous mass extinctions and historic catastrophic events, ScienceDirect)

The flu of 1890, 1918–1919 Spanish flu, 1957 Asian flu, 1968 Hong Kong flu, and 1977 Russian flu all led to mass deaths. Pandemics such as these remain major threats to human health that could lead to extremely high death rates. The 1918 pandemic is believed to have killed 50 million people [27]. AIDS (HIV) has killed an estimated 23 million people from 1978 to 2001 [15]. And there have been numerous other incidents of diseases such as cholera, dysentery, influenza, scurvy, smallpox, typhus, and plague that have caused the deaths of many millions throughout history. Clearly, these **biological diseases are much greater threats to human survival than other natural or environmental disasters**. Because bacterium and viral strains experience antigenic shifts (which are small changes in the virus that happen continually over time, eventually producing new virus strains that might not be recognized by the body’s immune system), another devastating pandemic could appear at any time. It should also be noted that **the threat from biological weapons is quite real**. In fact, scientists from the former Soviet Union’s bioweapons program claim to have developed an antibiotic-resistant strain of the plague [26].

### 3

#### The governments of 50 states and sub-federal territories should remove state and local restrictions on onshore natural gas production, including fracking, and provide substantial incentives for onshore natural gas production. The governments of 50 states and sub-federal territories with jurisdiction over offshore territories should remove restrictions on offshore natural gas production in areas under their jurisdiction.

#### Lifting state restrictions on fracking boosts production – harmonizes the state regulatory regime

Tennis 13 Mark P. Fitzsimmons and Rachel S., lawyers, 1-8, “A Continuing Wave: The Debate Over Regulation of Fracking Rolls On,” Power Magazine, http://www.powermag.com/environmental/A-Continuing-Wave-The-Debate-Over-Regulation-of-Fracking-Rolls-On\_5274.html

Whatever your opinion on fracking, it is clear there will be significant investment and development going forward. Government estimates of U.S. shale gas reserves have increased over the past five years, and some researchers claim that even those increased estimates are grossly understated. In its 2012 Annual Energy Outlook, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported that the U.S. has 2,203 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas—enough to supply more than 90 years of use at 2011 consumption rates. The EIA also predicts that the U.S. will become a net exporter of natural gas by 2020. A study prepared for America’s Natural Gas Alliance predicts that by 2035 the U.S. shale gas industry will support 1.6 million jobs, contribute more than $231 billion to the GDP, and add $57 billion in government revenues. Meanwhile, legal and technical barriers could delay shale gas development in other parts of the world for up to a decade. (In the European Union, several countries, such as France and Bulgaria, have passed laws banning fracking.) Particularly in this economic climate, these numbers are impossible to ignore. How much of this potential will be unlocked ultimately depends on several factors, not least the development and stabilization of a still-uncertain and multilayered regulatory regime. Fracking currently is regulated chiefly at the state level, and industry generally supports continued state-level regulation. In waging its battle against state regulators, the anti-fracking movement has succeeded in persuading local officials to further limit the practice at the municipal level. Many localities have instituted zoning controls or outright bans, though they have had mixed results defending these laws against state constitutional challenges. Meanwhile, the federal government has shown increasing willingness to regulate fracking. The Obama administration has been cautious initially, focusing largely on research and promoting regulatory efficiency. In April, industry praised President Obama for creating an interagency working group to coordinate efforts among the EPA, the Department of Energy, and the Department of the Interior. At the same time, some federal agencies have begun to exercise their regulatory authority. The Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM’s) proposed rule for regulating fracking operations on federal lands and the EPA’s new Clean Air Act requirements for natural gas wells represent the most significant developments to date. It remains to be seen whether the administration’s reelection “mandate” will include stricter controls. As this complicated regulatory framework continues to develop, it will require careful monitoring by any company reliant on expectations of inexpensive and abundant natural gas. Following our earlier article on U.S. fracking regulation last year, this article provides an update on the significant developments of recent months. State fracking laws differ widely. At the most stringent, a few states continue to enforce statewide bans or moratoria. Of states that allow fracking, some have very specific requirements, while others rely on performance-based standards or permit-specific controls. States with similar laws on the books may also enforce them very differently. An ongoing survey of state regulations shows that many states have requirements related to site development and preparation, well drilling and production, flowback/wastewater storage and disposal, and well plugging and abandonment. Several states in the mid-Atlantic’s Marcellus Shale region that have been cautious about allowing fracking in the past appear to be moving toward a somewhat more tolerant stance. New York has had a moratorium on fracking since 2008, when the state Department of Environmental Conservation began studying health impacts. Although the moratorium was set to expire on November 29, 2012, it was extended for 90 days to await completion of the ongoing study. Meanwhile, New York has issued a new set of draft regulations that would open a large swath of the state to fracking—but with significant limitations. Both environmental and industry groups have criticized the changes, which currently are open for public comment until January 12. New Jersey is also poised to move forward. In early 2012, Governor Chris Christie vetoed a bill that would have imposed a statewide fracking ban, instead instituting a one-year moratorium to allow the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection to “evaluate the findings of still outstanding and ongoing federal studies.” The moratorium is set to expire on January 27, although there is now a bill pending in the New Jersey legislature that would establish a new moratorium. Since there are no known shale gas deposits in New Jersey, the level of attention devoted to regulation there is somewhat surprising. Maryland, which has also had a de facto moratorium on fracking since 2011 while the state conducts safety studies, remains more uncertain. In response to recent industry pressure to move ahead, one Maryland legislator has announced her intention to propose a formal statutory moratorium in 2013. Pennsylvania has undoubtedly been the state most enthusiastic about Marcellus Shale development. In February 2012, Pennsylvania passed new legislation to further encourage the state’s already robust natural gas industry. Among other provisions, the new law included a statewide zoning plan to reduce municipalities’ ability to prevent fracking within their borders. Several municipalities challenged the law in state court, and on July 26, 2012, a seven-judge panel invalidated the statewide zoning program. Three judges dissented from the decision, which the state appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The case was argued in October, and the decision is still pending. Even if the state does not succeed on appeal, the new law will still encourage municipalities to allow fracking by providing for impact fees, which producers must pay to communities to cover impacts on roads and services. Along with likely developments in New York and New Jersey, this change will contribute to the Marcellus Shale’s growing importance to national shale gas production. Several states outside of the Marcellus Shale region are also in the midst of regulatory overhauls. In July, the North Carolina legislature legalized fracking over Governor Beverly Perdue’s veto, but provided that no permits may be issued until a regulatory program has been established and approved by the legislature. The Texas Railroad Commission, that state’s oil and gas regulatory agency, is updating its rules concerning drilling, cementing, and completing oil and gas wells. On the West Coast, the California Department of Conservation released proposed rules on December 18, and the California legislature will consider fracking legislation in its new session. The Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission has also proposed new regulations. In response to health and safety concerns, several states have beefed up requirements related to well construction and setback, chemical disclosure, and wastewater disposal. Pennsylvania recently issued new regulations requiring operators to develop emergency response plans. Both Ohio and Pennsylvania included new well-casing and siting requirements in their 2012 laws. Many states now require disclosure of chemicals used in fracking fluids, though the specific rules vary. Some states require industry to disclose both the volume and concentration of chemicals used (Arkansas, Louisiana, Montana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania), while others require only volume (Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Oklahoma) or concentration (Wyoming). Protections for confidential business information also differ. Ohio’s rule does not require any disclosure of trade secret information, while Pennsylvania’s rule requires disclosure of trade names and concentration to regulators and provides that the information is available to the public upon request. Wastewater disposal remains a contentious issue, since there are issues associated with each method of disposal (discharge to public treatment works, storage pits, or underground injection wells). In response to accidental releases of oil, drilling wastewater, and other fluids, in 2012, North Dakota regulators issued new rules banning the storage of liquid waste from oil and gas drilling operations in open pits. Ohio’s Department of Natural Resources also recently addressed concerns about underground injection well disposal by passing new rules to allow the Department to request well safety tests. The Department has now lifted a moratorium on underground injection well permitting that was instituted in response to a number of earthquakes in 2011. Particularly in light of the ongoing studies in several states, it is clear that state regulations will continue to evolve as more information about the science becomes available. Private sector research will also continue to be influential. To date, studies of varying quality on both ends of the spectrum have received significant attention and influenced the conversation. Local Regulation: Questionable Validity? While anti-fracking forces have waged war at all levels of government, they have had measurable success in getting strict measures passed at the local level. About 300 municipalities in 16 states have passed measures limiting fracking or banning it outright. Not all of these measures will have a practical effect, since some were passed in areas without shale gas reserves, but they are nonetheless symbolic of generalized public concern. The legal status of municipal controls depends on the state and the context. The authority of Pennsylvania municipalities to control fracking remains in question pending the state’s appeal of its invalidated legislation. A similar state-local battle is playing out in Colorado. In July 2012, the town of Longmont adopted an “operating agreement” with a drilling company that included a ban on fracking in residential neighborhoods. The state quickly sued to invalidate the agreement as preempted under state law. More recently, during the November 6 election, Longmont passed a ballot initiative banning fracking altogether. Governor John Hickenlooper has since announced that the state will not challenge the ban. Meanwhile, the Colorado Oil and Gas Association has filed suit in state court seeking to overturn it. While the New York Department of Environmental Conservation continues to sit on its draft rules, the state appears to have embraced local initiatives to some extent. The current draft rules require industry to analyze the applicability of local ordinances when applying for state permits. Meanwhile, more than 170 New York municipalities have instituted controls, with more being enacted seemingly every day. State courts have upheld bans imposed by the towns of Dryden and Middlefield. In a more recent case, the New York Supreme Court held that a municipality may not enact a moratorium on fracking without providing evidence to support “a justification, based on the safety and health of the community, for the banning of gas exploration, storage and extraction.” The reach of this decision will likely be limited, since the court also agreed with the Dryden and Middlefield cases that such measures are not preempted by state law. Cities have traditionally retained authority over land use and zoning, and fracking opponents argue that retaining such control is essential to protecting citizens from unwanted industrial uses and risks to health and the environment. Depending on where they are in force, however, such laws have the potential to limit opportunities for developing the shale gas industry in an economical manner and could significantly limit states’ ability to promote economic development on a statewide basis.

### 4

#### TEXT: The United States Department of Energy and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should approve applications to export natural gas.

#### Massively boosts domestic production

Matthews 12—Merrill Matthews, resident scholar at the Institute for Policy Innovation, 12/27/12, Don't ban natural-gas exports, http://blogs.providencejournal.com/ri-talks/this-new-england/2012/12/merrill-matthews-dont-ban-natural-gas-exports.html   
"'There's nothing like being a victim of your own success." That must be what American natural-gas producers are thinking right now.¶ Their profound success in recent years in expanding our national energy supply has inspired American policymakers to consider strapping them with strict new trade restrictions.¶ These regulatory efforts are deeply misguided and will ultimately deprive the country of jobs and growth.¶ Thanks to major innovations in drilling techniques, America faces a natural-gas surplus, with the per-unit price of gas now sitting at just $3 - about one-third to one-fifth the price in Europe and Asia. Utility plants have shifted from cheap coal to even cheaper - and cleaner - natural gas.¶ As a result, energy-related carbon emissions have been declining rapidly and now sit at levels not seen since the early 1990s.¶ But natural-gas supply is outpacing demand. So, producers have cut back on extraction and the drilling of new wells. Many are turning back to more profitable oil plays. The number of natural-gas rigs now in operation is half the total of a year ago.¶ As a result, natural gas producers are looking for new markets. The U.S. currently exports some natural gas to Canada and Mexico, but the real opportunities lie in overseas markets, where prices are much higher.¶ Shipping natural gas across great distances is challenging. It can't be easily loaded on a tanker like crude oil, so producers have to liquify it. The process involves super cooling gas to -260 degrees Fahrenheit, and the necessary facilities to cool it are predictably quite costly.¶ Most distressingly, however, is that the Department of Energy has been dragging its feet when considering natural gas firms' applications to establish export facilities. The department was waiting on a just-released study intended to assess the impact of natural-gas exports on domestic natural-gas prices. The study concluded that expanding natural-gas exports would be an economic winner.¶ "In all of these cases, benefits that come from export expansion more than outweigh the losses from reduced capital and wage income to U.S. consumers, and hence LNG exports have net economic benefits in spite of higher domestic natural gas prices," according to the report. We'll have to see how the DOE responds.¶ Private-sector companies have also been raising concerns that expanding exports could also force them to pay higher gas prices. They claim that cheap natural gas is spurring economic growth here at home and providing America's manufacturing sector with a valuable competitive advantage.¶ But their concerns, while understandable, are overblown. Allowing natural-gas exports would, at worst, drive up domestic prices only slightly. The consulting firm Deloitte took a close look at the issue and determined that allowing exports would increase domestic prices by just 1.7 percent over the next 20 years.¶ What's more, banning exports might have the unintended consequence of driving gas prices up. Firms are already cutting back on production because of historically low prices. If they can't sell at higher prices in foreign markets, this ratcheting back will continue, causing the domestic gas supply to shrink anyway and forcing prices skyward. That's the very last thing we want.¶ And even if expanding gas exports pushes domestic prices up initially, natural-gas producers would have a new, substantial financial incentive to further ramp up production and develop more wells. This expansion would increase supply and put downward pressure on domestic prices.¶ Plus, expanding natural gas production to meet new foreign demand would create new jobs right here at home. Banning exports would deprive Americans of those opportunities.

### 5

#### The United States federal government should increase helium extraction

solves their leadership advantage

### 5

#### ---Assessment of energy security on the outer continental shelf cannot be separated from the desire for an exceptionalist national identity to be secured. Their advantage scenarios are not objective assessments of facts but rather a form of militarized knowledge production that lies at the intersection of a desire for coherence and sovereign power.

Martens 2011

Emily, Masters in Geography graduate at University of Miami, The Discourses of Energy and Environmental Security in the Debate Over Offshore Oil Drilling Policy in Florida, Open Access Theses. Paper 254, http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=oa\_theses

The term energy security has become an engrained and seemingly unquestioned term within the contemporary political arena since earlier articulation under President Carter. The definition of the term seems to change according to shifting agendas and the socio-political zeitgeist, as evidenced in the previous historical narrative. In the United States energy security has encompassed a plethora of meanings that are the result of divergent understandings of the functioning of political and economic structures, as well as the social or ‘national’ significance of key energy resources, such as oil (Barton et al. 2004). From the consumer standpoint, oil (or in its refined form as gasoline), particularly cheap oil, is not simply the fuel for transportation and production, but also a signifier of the “American Way of Life”, a symbol of American exceptionalism and status within the global community (Huber 2009; Moran and Russell 2009). Traditionally, security has been conceptualized in terms of border protection, as well as the protection and promotion of ideologies and values both domestically and abroad. In reference to Foucault, Dalby alleges that there is a “political impulse to secure” through the invocation of “effective discourses of danger… contained within widely shared geopolitical imaginaries”, which serve to unify identities and justify State action (Dalby 2002: 146). Here it is a national identity contained within the discourse of energy security, and the popular rhetoric of “drill, baby, drill” that manages to thwart environmental sustainability efforts, thereby increasing incentives to expand domestic drilling sites. Resources have, historically, been at the heart of many quarrels, whereby certain types of natural resources available only in specific areas, become essential ingredients for the productive process. An adequate supply of these resources must be assured, and so the commercial tentacles of the productive unit must expand, until in some instances it draws upon supplies extracted from every corner of the planet. Inasmuch as every productive unit becomes dependent upon its sources of raw materials, every actual or potential denial of access to them represents a threat to the maintenance of that unit and to the well-being of its beneficiaries (Leiss 1994:156-157). Therefore, state security begins to encompass the productive process to ensure access to those resources which have become embedded within the daily functioning of the State’s commercial, social and political activities. The State security apparatus, therefore, must step in to protect and ensure sufficient access to oil as a means of ensuring its own survival and economic wellbeing (Barton et al. 2004; Muller-Kraener 2008; Ciuta 2010). The term security, therefore, “does not refer to an external, objective reality, but establishes a security situation by itself. It is the enunciation of the signifier which constitutes an (in)security condition…organiz[ing] social relations into security relations” for the purpose of protecting State interests (Dalby 2002: 12). The discourse of US energy security operates under the pretense of national security interests to ensure the protection and sufficient flow of key resources. Now whether an actually supply problem or political motives dictate the decision to create another offshore well is often difficult to determine. However, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the nationalistic, “Buy American” political sentiment increased drastically, with some gas stations claiming to sell only domestic, or “terrorist-free”, oil, thus creating an incentive to increase domestic production in one of the few remaining spaces for extraction and production: the outer continental shelf (Huber 2009).

#### ---Securitizing natural gas supply creates a self-fulfilling prophecy --- Externalizes danger risking miscalculation and war.

Lowth 2011

Colonel R. G., British Army, ‘Securitization’ and its effect on Strategic Thinking, SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER, Royal Defense Studies

Gas security has become synonymous with gas supply. Indeed the former has been established, and institutionalised, as the preferred term. Like Lakoff’s elephant, the connection between gas and security is today not only persistent, it is also irresistible. This conflation of security and supply has created, and through common usage perpetuates, a presumption that gas supply is intrinsically insecure, survival is at stake, special measures are necessary, and specific security actors are thereby empowered: When a particular [...] designation is accepted and taken for granted, something akin to a paradigm exists. When one paradigm and its adherents become the ultimate arbiter of “reality” in society, we say a hegemony of definition exists (Conrad and Schneider, 1992:181). Strategic thinking about gas supply has become security thinking. Formerly commercial and economic outcomes have been translated into security outcomes,30 sought in extremis by hard security or military means, often usurping compromises in other areas,31 and contradicting market fundamentals.32 Securitization of the gas market has also disrupted ‘consumer/producer’ or ‘customer/supplier’ relations, privileging instead ‘friend and foe’ (ie. opposition beyond mere competition): ‘while casting an issue as one of ‘security’ may help elevate its position on the political agenda, it also risks placing that issue within the logic of threat and decision, and potentially within the contrast of friend and enemy’ (Williams, 2003:523). One of the unintended consequences of this elevation, and shift in emphasis from the economic to the security spheres, has been to frustrate EU attempts to enhance its status, and collective bargaining power, as a gas consumer (the largest in the world). While, from as early as 2006, member states have supported in principle the notion of a common energy policy, many have been reluctant in practice to cede authority for security of gas supplies to the EU: ‘In [the economic domain] ... securitization is a way of taking economic nationalist positions in economic policy debates without having to abandon superficial commitments to the liberal consensus’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 115). So, despite their ‘communitarian rhetoric’ (Aliboni, 2008:4), member states – touched by the perceived threat of gas shortages – have chosen to act unilaterally to safeguard their own interests: ‘the broad consensus over the need for a more integrated energy policy ran parallel with EU member states’ reinforced trend to affirm their own national energy policies,’ (Natorski and Surrallés, 2008:72). Germany, for example, has struck bilateral agreements with Russia that include both long-term supply contracts and also the construction of North European Gas Pipeline (Nordstream) that will enhance Germany’s future gas security – but not necessarily serve the collective interests of the EU most effectively. In the south, where the EU is planning to construct its own Nabucco pipeline, Hungary and Italy have struck deals with Gazprom to build a South Stream pipeline in direct competition. Securitization has promoted self-interested or ‘narrow minded’ – and, in a community-sense, somewhat hypocritical – national thinking (Umbach, 2010:1239): ‘In [the economic domain] ... securitization is a way of taking economic nationalist positions in economic policy debates without having to abandon superficial commitments to the liberal consensus’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 115). In short, securitization has had a paradoxical effect on strategic thinking. While economic logic and EU competence favours collective EU action, the spectre of insecurity – understood and interpreted differently by individual states – has prevented the requisite solidarity and mobilization: ‘What unites the discourse of all member states is the emphasis on their competencies in determining their national strategies for security of supply ... [S]ecurity framing of energy is precisely what justified [member states’] reluctance to ... transfer competencies to the supranational level’ (ibid: 82,83). Externalization Securitization ‘externalizes’ strategic thinking about gas supplies in three interrelated ways: it establishes gas security as an intrinsically external problem; it prejudices cooperative relations with other gas stakeholders; and it introduces the prospect of reciprocal defensive strategies by other states, especially suppliers such as Russia, with unforeseeable consequences. Constructing gas supply as a security issue creates the perception that states are entitled to receive adequate gas, in the same way that they are entitled to enjoy national security (of which gas security is portrayed as an integral part). Any actual or potential shortfall in gas supply is therefore treated as if it were (rather than because it necessarily is) an existential threat. At the same time, in common with other threats to national security, the danger is deemed to exist outside. Self is threatened by other. The overall effect is powerful: the state is entitled to supplies of gas (akin, as well as contributing, to national security) and ‘they’, out there, are endangering those supplies. One of the consequences of conceptualising ‘gas for the EU’ as a security of supply issue, is that insecurity is thereby framed as something that is ‘done to’ the EU – a victim, threatened by aggressive producer/suppliers (Belyi, 2009). This externalization diverts thinking away from domestic aspects of the problem, and displaces potential internal solutions (which appear irrelevant compared with tackling the external threat). One of the principal and relentless critics of the EU’s securitization of gas supply, Pierre Noël, of the Cambridge Energy Policy Research Group, has argued continually in favour of internal EU market solutions to ensure adequate supplies of gas to member states.33 Successful securitization has, however, left little analytical space for his contention that ‘[economic rather than security] risks require that we let the markets work’ (Noel, 2008:1). His proposition forms the basis of a possible re-framing of energy security at the end of this section.

#### ---The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s knee-jerk call for technocratic energy production in favor of repoliticizing energy security shifting the debate from a question of how to generate the most amount of energy to how to organize our energy structures in an egalitarian manner. Only the alternative’s step back from energy policy can avert extinction.

Hillyard et. al. 12

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012-Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

In sum, encouraging a rational debate about “energy security” necessitates understanding what is meant not only by the phrase, but also by its composite parts. The term “energy,” despite its apparent simplicity, presents particular challenges. During the past two centuries, the vernacular, varied, lower-case “energies” of commons regimes have been joined by a new, abstract, upper-case Energy evolved in industrialised societies. Exploring the difference between “energies” and Energy is crucial to understanding the international politics of “energy security”. Abstract, monolithic, seemingly limitless Energy is something that only became possible with fossil-fuelled productivism and the machines, networks and institutions that came with it. This Energy, like lowercase “energies”, can deliver the basic necessities of life, at least to some, lending a certain plausibility to politicians’ claims that their worries about “energy security” centre on keeping the lights on and homes warm. But its underlying logic is different. Upper-case Energy is a transformation and commensuration of specific energies into a general capacity to maximise the ability of human bodies to make stuff. As the First Law of Thermodynamics (developed at the same time as industrial capitalism) recognises, any form of energy can be transformed into others and used to do work (but cannot be created or destroyed). Just as the invention of an absolute Time independent of daylight variations and traditional holidays helped discipline early industrial workers into the regular rhythm of a long working day, so too the subsequent development of an abstract Energy was key to intensifying their productivity further and harnessing them to the pace of the machine. For this upper-case Energy, survival is incidental except insofar as it supports the production imperative. Whereas specific “energies” know their limits, of Energy there can never be too much. Other things being equal, the more there is, the more can be produced, and the more money business can make, without limit. Lower-case “energies” and Big-E Energy are not only different: they are also, in many senses, enemies to each other. In order that fragmented “energies” do not become an obstacle to the mobilisation of economic value, they have to be folded into abstract Energy under the care of dedicated disciplines and institutions (bureaucrats, engineers, statisticians, laboratories, economics departments, inventors, investors, armies). Obsessed with quantitative growth for growth’s sake, Energy tends to treat the right of all to a warm home (or a cool one in hotter climes), cooked food, electric light as a nuisance. It heralds a world that is not only unequal, but also unable to respect the common right to subsistence. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of agrofuels, whose “interchangeability” with oil under the rubric of a unitary Energy makes routine the replacement of subsistence agriculture with industrial cropping aimed at fuelling cars and airplanes. It is also plain in India’s development plans, which call for US$100 billion to be spent on a burgeoning number of large Energy projects – coal, oil, hydropower and renewables – that will serve above all to boost the profits of industrialists but leave less than 2 per cent for the household use of the 700 million who lack modern services. And it can be seen in South Africa’s policy of providing some of the cheapest electricity in the world to smelting companies while many township residents are forced to pirate electricity illegally because the price is out of their reach. Well over a century into the era of electrification, more than a billion people, about one-quarter of the world’s population, have no access to electricity or other non-biotic forms of energy (and many will never have under fossil-fuelled capitalism). If fossil-fuelled capitalism has defined what we mean by energy, then merely to use the word uncritically is to make a commitment to certain assumptions about scarcity, foreclose certain alternatives and cover up some of the most important issues that need to be discussed. Paradoxically, having a serious discussion about “energy security” requires taking a therapeutic step back from the modern concept of Energy itself. For example, the seemingly innocent query “How can we have energy security in a post-fossil world?” is not so much a question as an ultimatum. The question implies that however we organise our societies in future, it will have to be on the model that fossil capitalism built, with its threats to the right to survive of both humans and nonhumans (and the associated threats to “security” itself, on a commons understanding). A more fruitful question would be: “Is the world that is defined (in part) by the modern concept of Energy the world that we want?” It is just such questions that policymakers and social movements must ask when initiating any discussion of energy security.

### 6

#### EST won’t pass without increased drilling on federal lands.

Dizikes and Banerjee 3-16-13

Cynthia and Neela, Chicago Tribune, Obama touts new energy trust at Argonne National Laboratory, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-met-obama-argonne-energy-20130316,0,2922747.story

A project like the trust aimed at weaning the country off gasoline might be offered as a way to mute criticism from environmentalists before a decision on Keystone XL. Under the proposal, no new territory would be added to federal lands already set aside for energy development, White House officials said, indicating that the money would flow to research at government laboratories, universities and private companies. "This is not a Democratic idea or a Republican idea," Obama said. "This is just a smart idea." It will, however, require the support from both Democrats and Republicans to pass through Congress — a challenging possibility in the current political climate. "For this proposal to even be plausible, oil and gas leasing on federal land would need to increase dramatically," said Brendan Buck, spokesman for House Speaker John Boehner, a Republican. "Unfortunately, this administration has consistently slowed, delayed and blocked American energy production."

#### Removing restrictions is a key bargaining chip

Taylor 2013

Phil, Greenwire, Obama's energy trust doesn't include expanded drilling, http://rlch.org/news/obamas-energy-trust-doesnt-include-expanded-drilling

That is likely to come as a relief for conservationists who have opposed drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, but it will disappoint some lawmakers and energy groups that argue new access is needed to increase revenues. Obama prominently featured the proposed Energy Security Trust in his hourlong State of the Union speech last night as he also pledged to take executive steps to curb global warming gases and speed drilling and renewable energy production on public lands. "I propose we use some of our oil and gas revenues to fund an Energy Security Trust that will drive new research and technology to shift our cars and trucks off oil for good," Obama said. "If a nonpartisan coalition of CEOs and retired generals and admirals can get behind this idea, then so can we." He was referring to the group Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE), which last December proposed such a trust be funded by revenues from drilling in frontier areas including the Atlantic, Pacific, ANWR and the eastern Gulf of Mexico. But the White House said the trust would be funded by drilling that currently occurs on public lands and waters. The administration will propose that $200 million be set aside each year for the next decade to support the transition to electric- and natural gas-powered vehicles and homegrown biofuels. The proposal assumes an increase in production on public lands. The White House in its fiscal 2014 budget plans to propose a 20 percent increase for the Bureau of Land Management's oil and gas program, which would support faster approvals of leasing and drilling on public lands in the West. Obama's energy trust proposal drew support from key lawmakers, business and military officials, and at least one conservationist, even as some Republicans criticized it as another wasteful spending program. But without new revenues from expanded drilling, it is unclear whether Congress would authorize a portion of oil and gas money that currently goes to the U.S. Treasury to be siphoned for research into new vehicle technologies and biofuels. Such legislation may be a difficult sell as Congress tackles the nation's deficit woes. "CBO is going to have a fit if you try to spend it twice," said Robert Dillon, spokesman for Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska), the ranking member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. "This is just more rhetoric unfortunately, and it's disappointing." Murkowski this morning released a statement praising the president's trust proposal, noting that her energy blueprint earlier this month proposed a similar Advanced Energy Trust Fund, which would use new energy revenues to support renewable energy, energy efficiency, alternative fuels and advanced vehicles. But that proposal also assumes new drilling access is allowed in places including ANWR. "New production on previously closed federal lands could provide a substantial source of new revenue to fund research on the most promising new energy technologies, while paying down the national debt," Murkowski said. "I intend to get to work on this as soon as possible." And SAFE, in pitching the Energy Security Trust in a report last December, said money should come from drilling in frontier areas currently off limits, which it estimates could raise roughly $88 billion over the next 20 years from new leasing bids and royalties. Such a proposal would be strongly opposed by environmentalists and many Democrats. It would take an act of Congress to open the eastern Gulf or ANWR and a major shift in administrative policy to allow drilling in the Atlantic and Pacific, which the Interior Department has barred until at least 2017. Interior last summer finalized a 2012-2017 offshore leasing plan that excludes sales in the Atlantic and Pacific, areas that Interior Secretary Ken Salazar has argued are ill-equipped to respond to potential spills and where some states have opposed drilling off their shores. "There are no plans, as you know, to open up those areas, unless Obama gets a third term," said Dan Kish, senior vice president for policy at the industry-backed Institute for Energy Research. "Maybe the president is talking about revisiting his plan, but there has been no discussion of that." One conservationist said he believes oil and gas revenues from current drilling is enough to fund research into green technologies and the conservation of public lands. Oil, gas and coal from public lands and waters raised $12 billion in bonus bids, rents and royalties in 2012, according to Interior. About $6 billion went to the Treasury, said Alan Rowsome, who oversees conservation funding for the Wilderness Society. "Like everyone else, we want to hear more about the details," Rowsome said. Congress must also ensure the Land and Water Conservation Fund, which is supported through offshore drilling revenues, is funded at its maximum $900 million a year, Rowsome said. It's unclear what effect diverting more money from oil and gas revenues would have on funding for LWCF, which is a top White house priority but which Congress rarely ever fully funds. A report released yesterday by the White House says the Energy Security Trust carries broad bipartisan support and "will support research into a range of cost-effective technologies -- like advanced vehicles that run on electricity, homegrown biofuels, and vehicles that run on domestically-produced natural gas." In a conference call this morning, officials from SAFE said they are hopeful the White House will also consider additional drilling on public lands and off shores. "We believe there is a group of Democrats and Republicans that could introduce something like this," said SAFE President Robbie Diamond. "Somewhere in there, there is an agreement."

#### EST kills the economy and leads to a carbon tax

McCown 2013

Brigham A., former President's chief energy transportation regulator and worked under both Republican and Democratic Cabinet Secretaries, Is the White House Proposing A Massive Carbon Tax? http://www.forbes.com/sites/brighammccown/2013/02/13/proposed-energy-security-trust-equals-massive-carbon-tax/

The current idea is to create a government run fund that would be overseen by thought leaders opposed to fossil fuel. The money received by taxing the oil and gas industry would then be spent by the government to support research for electric vehicles, biofuels, solar, and hydrogen fuel cells. The end goal is to eventually replace gasoline and diesel fuel from cars and trucks. While we do not know the details, Larson’s original bill would impose a per-unit tax on the carbon dioxide content of fossil fuels, beginning at a rate of $15 per metric ton of CO2. Just for reference, the average passenger car obtains 20.3 miles per gallon. Therefore, a car driven 12,000 miles per year would roughly be responsible for generating 5.5 metric tons of CO2 per year. Naturally commercial motor vehicles, buses and the like would generate even more on a per unit basis. Airlines would face an even higher cost on a per unit basis. Aside from the obvious fact that any such tax would be passed along to consumers in the form of even higher fuel costs, such an artificial increase to the operating costs of every personal, business and construction vehicle used in the country would have a chilling effect on our fragile economic recovery. Airlines struggling to avoid bankruptcy would potentially fare worse, and let’s not forget that the vast majority of trains run on fuel that would be affected by this government imposed tax. On the other hand, the plan boasts an incentive for those who “stop contributing to global warming” by granting them a bigger payroll tax rebate. While enacting a tax for a trust fund traditionally requires the approval from Congress, the President boldly declared, “If Congress won’t act soon to protect future generations, I will. I will direct my cabinet to come up with executive actions we can take.” In essence, the “Energy Security Trust Fund” is an attempt to levy a new national tax affecting everything we purchase in this country. That Starbucks cup of coffee didn’t just materialize, the coffee, equipment and even plastic lids was transported to your neighborhood location. It would be somewhat untenable to suggest that the actual operating costs would not in turn, be passed along to consumers. Given the government’s less than stellar track record at say, running any other governmental program, it is difficult to imagine how this program would result in any benefit to the average taxpayer. At worse, it is simply another attempt to artificially manipulate the winners the losers in the energy industry by raising costs on one form of energy products while subsidizing another. Instead of trying to control the markets, policymakers should be looking at ways for renewables to compete on a level playing field with fossil fuels. That’s not to say that the government shouldn’t pursue R&D, but there’s a real difference between initial investment in experimental research and subsidizing a go-to-market strategy for private companies. Real change will occur when renewables can compete with fossil fuels. Opponents point out that the oil and gas industry, the nuclear industry, and many other industries received favorable treatment when they were in their infancy. That is a true statement, but then again, this isn’t the early 1900s, or even the 1950s when we were locked in a cold war against the Soviet Union. Moreover, the country was not staggering under a $16 trillion dollar deficit either.

#### Carbon tax causes massive food price spikes.

Popoff 2013

Mischa, former Advanced Organic Farm and Process Inspector, author of the critically-acclaimed book, Is it Organic?, Carbon Tax Would Hurt Farmers, Drive Up Food Prices, 2-14-13, http://blog.heartland.org/2013/02/carbon-tax-would-hurt-farmers-drive-up-food-prices/

Whenever politicians talk about curbing greenhouse gas emissions, they’re really talking about higher food prices. Farming contributes more greenhouse gas than any other industry, sector or activity; a whopping 37 percent of a developed nations’ total greenhouse gas emissions! Naturally, proponents of anthropogenic-global-warming theory place the blame for all of this so-called pollution on factory farms and food miles. But it turns out that the carbon footprint of organic fertilizer (compost) is on the order of 14 times higher than that of conventional fertilizer made with the Haber-Bosch ammonia synthesis process. (See for instance Steve Savage, “Organic Farming Would Be Better In Terms of Climate Change Impact. Right?” on Sustainablog, November 10th, 2009; and James McWilliams, “Organic Agriculture: A Solution to Global Warming?” New York Times, June 2, 2010.) The truth is it will always take a certain amount of energy, and hence a certain amount of methane and CO2, to produce a given amount of food. What are we supposed to do? Starve to save the planet? In all seriousness, this is a question that needs to be posed to crusaders like Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Bernie Sanders (Socialist-VT). There’s a good chance they’re not even aware of which sector of the economy is actually to “blame” for the imagined curse of rising atmospheric CO2 levels. And if it turns out they are aware, then they need to be pinned down on exactly how much of a rise in food prices they would deem acceptable. 100 percent? 200 percent? That’s what they currently pay in the European Union thanks to all the taxes on energy on that continent. Or how about a ten-fold increase in food prices like they’re stuck with in Cuba?… a nation which was recently applauded by organic activists for being the world’s first organic country. (See The Coming Insurrection, written by the invisible committee, MIT Press, 2009, p. 26: “The most advanced experimentation with ‘organic’ agriculture on a global level has taken place since 1989 on the island of Cuba.” Just as absurd is the claim by Hamas agriculture minister, Muhammad al-Agha, that the Gaza strip is “going organic” after Israel banned nitrogen fertilizer. See Jon Elmer, “Going organic: The siege on Gaza,” Aljazeera.net, August 9, 2010, 14:22 Mecca Time. Hamas claims, and much of the media actually believes, that Israel is trying to starve Gazans, but of course Israel rightly banned nitrogen fertilizer because it’s a deadly explosive.) What’s more, “locavores” − people who eat only locally-grown food from small farms and who are tightly affiliated with organic activists − are actually responsible for elevated greenhouse gas emissions even when their local food isn’t fertilized with compost. It turns out only 11 percent of CO2 emissions associated with modern food-production is generated in its transportation (it can be as low as 4 percent, even when crossing the world’s oceans). Meanwhile, a whopping 80 percent of food-related CO2 emissions result from production (plowing, cultivating, seeding, spraying and harvesting), an area where big farms are naturally much more efficient. (See Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, SuperFreakonomics, William Morrow, 2009.) Politicians like Boxer and Sanders will always pretend to be going after oil and coal companies. But the fact of the matter is that the products oil and coal companies sell to consumers (gas and electricity) are already taxed at exorbitant rates with no discernible impact on these industries. None. But knowing that the American farmer is one of the biggest consumers of fossil fuels (diesel and fertilizer), you’d think even ideologues like Boxer and Sanders could connect the dots and tell us the truth: that our grocery bill is about to go sky high if they get their way.

#### Global war.

Jeff Horwich and Rob Bailey 12 Interim host of Marketplace Morning Report & Royal Institute of International Affairs, http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/us-drought-could-have-global-impact-food-prices

Bailey: Well America is an agricultural superpower as well as a traditional global superpower, so it's the biggest producer of maize in the world, it's the biggest producer of soy beans in the world. So as soon as there's a decrease in U.S. agricultural production, that has massive effects for the global economy. These sorts of price impacts could ripple across economies across borders. Horwich: And geopolitically, let's just think back a few years when food prices start to rocket in some parts of the world, crazy things can happen. Bailey: Absolutely, if you think back to 2008 in Haiti the government actually fell as a result of riots connected to food prices. Fast forward a couple more years to 2011, the Arab Spring actually was sparked by initial protests in a number of countries about the price of bread because the price of wheat had gone up in response to export bans following a really bad harvest in Russia and Ukraine after a heat wave and wild fires there. Horwich: Are there any particular flash points that you are looking at this time around? Bailey: The situation in the Middle East remains much the same, there is still huge political vulnerability to a spike in wheat prices. The other thing that the U.S. is having a big impact on is soy bean prices. But if we see a very sharp increase soy bean prices, you can expect meat prices to rise and this could actually have implications for China, quite seriously.

## Case

### Helium

#### Concentration is too low

Ross 2012

Robert, Junior Analyst – Casey Research, Where Has All the Helium Gone?, May 3 2012, http://www.caseyresearch.com/articles/where-has-all-helium-gone

Much of the helium( as radioactive by-product formed in the Earth's crust) collects in natural gas deposits. But these trace amounts of helium are not worthwhile to recover at current prices; miners typically let the gas escape into the atmosphere. Only a large concentration – usually 0.3% or higher – is economically viable to retrieve.

#### Other countries drilling solves – no reason the US is key to helium.

#### The 1AC Nelson evidence indicates prices will recover in 2013 and that this is a SHORT TERM problem.

Nelson 12 (Walter Nelson – Director, Helium Sourcing and Supply Chain Air Products and Chemicals, Inc, 7/20/12, Helium: Supply Shortages Impacting our Economy, National Defense and Manufacturing, Congressional Documents & Publications, lexis )

There have been planned and unplanned maintenance outages at natural gas processing plants, as well as continuing pipeline allocations on the BLM system during well maintenance that have restricted the supply of crude helium to the U.S. refiners. In Algeria and Qatar, production of helium has decreased due to the fragile worldwide economy, as well as maintenance work at gas palnts. In addition, new helium refining projects have been slow to develop. The delayed start-up of one particular plant in Wyoming has postponed access to major new supplies of helium. Combined, these issues have reduced the global helium supply by as much as 5% to 10%. On top of this, the industry will experience an unprecedented helium shortage this summer. Beyond the developments cited above, there are currently three US plant outages or curtailments that are severely limiting the short-term supply of helium today. First, one company reduced its helium production in Wyoming by approximately 20% beginning early June while performing critical maintenance activities. Full production is not expected to resume until sometime later this summer. The impact of this curtailment is almost five percent of global supply capacity. Second, the crude helium enrichment plant that supplies the BLM pipeline system was shut down July 15th for a planned 10 day safety critical outage. During this outage helium deliveries are limited to pipeline inventory reducing global supply capacity by an additional 25%. Third, a nautral gas plant in Kansas experienced an unplanned helium equipment outage at the end of June and that outage continued through this week. The impact of this outage was another five percent reduction in global supply capacity. In helium circles this has been "the perfect storm." The combination of these issues has resulted in a significant short-term reduction in global helium supply capacity over the summer months. Global inventories would have normally served as a buffer during short-term outage events, minimizing the supply impacts. Unfortunately that's not the case this time. Air Products has had to allocate our customers and I suspect that all helium suppliers have had to do the same. We are caught in a cruch not of our making. We expect some relief soon. Most of the maintenance outages will be completed within weeks, in the U.S. and abroad.That said, it will most probably take months for the global helium supply chains to recover from these summer outages. Helium supplies will continue to remain tight through 2012 and into 2013, when new helium production is expected in Wyoming and Qatar. The Wyoming project is expected to add four percent helium capacity and the Qatar II project may add up to 18% capacity. Only after these two new plants are operational in 2013 and existing plants are running back at full output will the global supply begin to fully stabilize.

#### It will take years to get production.

Sklar 2013

Scott, President, The Stella Group, Ltd & Adjunct Professor GWU, Oil-Spill Risks Must Be Considered http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2013/01/are-arctic-oildrilling-challen.php

The economics, technology and outlook all point to the viability of Arctic OCS development and the need for it. While it may be years before any meaningful production of oil comes online, the United States should be taking steps now to expand exploration and production in order to meet future demand – not to discourage it. Energy security, economic growth, and scientific understanding and leadership are reasons to “do big things” in the Arctic. No one is trying to abdicate the responsibility for protecting the environment. But now is not the time to let fear drive public policy. Let’s take a leading role and make the Arctic with all of its economic and energy security benefits, a resource for all Americans.

No helium shortage---their evidence conflates price with supply

Worstall 12 (Tim Worstall, Contributor @ Forbes, writes about business and technology.“What Great Helium Shortage?” http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/08/27/what-great-helium-shortage/)

We’re being regaled again with stories about how the world is running out of a resource. This time it’s helium and as ever, the story is driven by people not really understanding what a resource actually is. The party could soon be over for the balloon industry as a global shortage of helium sends prices sky high. Industry experts have warned that the floating balloon could be a thing of the past by the end of the decade as demand for the gas continues to outstrip supply capabilities. Sounds scary, eh? The thing is there’s a confusion here between the current extraction infrastructure and the total amount of the element available to us. Helium is usually generated as a byproduct of natural gas mining, the shortage could also be attributed in part to the recession which has slowed natural gas production. The US provides 75 per cent of the six billion cubic feet of helium used worldwide every year. A pipeline in Texas which provided 30 per cent of the global supply was closed for maintenance in July, with a major Wyoming plant running below capacity since June. Production shortfalls and repairs at plants in Algeria, Poland and Australia have also hit supplies. It is absolutely true that prices are currently tight. That parts of the current production system are closed down and thus supplies are lower than usual. However, this is not the same as stating that we’re actually running out of the stuff. The source for the real numbers is, for an element, always the US Geological Survey. Their helium note tells us that current global consumption is around 180 million cubic metres a year. There’s something like 50 billion cubic metres lying around out there. That’s a near 300 year supply at current usage rates. Another way of putting this is that sure, party balloons are a bit more expensive right now but there’s no worry over whether our great great grandchildren will still be able to have them. Oh, and by the way, that’s before anyone has got around to trying to check the helium content of all that shale gas being fracked.

#### Government price setting takes out the internal link.

Ross 2012

Robert, Junior Analyst – Casey Research, Where Has All the Helium Gone?, May 3 2012, http://www.caseyresearch.com/articles/where-has-all-helium-gone

Although recent developments in asteroid mining could alter our current perception of scarcity, commodities like oil and gas are becoming increasingly difficult to harvest, as most of the low-hanging fruit has already been picked. As current reserves become more capital intensive to access, consumers will continue to see the prices of oil and gas rise until a substitute is introduced. But these same laws also apply to other finite minerals and elements. Take, for example, helium. As the second-most abundant element in the observable universe, helium is the most commonly used inert gas in the world. Most helium in the universe – helium-4 – is believed to have formed during the Big Bang, but our limited supply on Earth was formed over billions of years through the radioactive decay of uranium and thorium atoms in the Earth's mantle, a process that generates just 3.4 liters per kilometer per year. Besides increasing the pitch of one's voice and inflating party balloons, helium is used in cryogenics, particularly for cooling superconducting magnets in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machines; by NASA to clean and pressurize rocket engines; in deep-sea diving; inflating airships; and other applications. Its low density and boiling point (the lowest on the periodic table) make it an ideal substance for a wide range of industrial and scientific uses. Despite its commercial viability, the price of helium has remained at artificially low rates since the mid-1990s. Much of the supply glut is attributed to a measure passed by the US government entitled the Helium Privatization Act, which stipulated that the amount of helium sold off each year from the National Helium Reserve should follow a straight line, with the same amount being sold each year irrespective of the global demand for it. A basic supply and demand model will tell you that when the government sets the price of any good below the market price, shortages are soon to follow. As a Boston Herald article explains, local companies that depend on helium are already noticing rising prices and shortages. The federal government's involvement in the helium market began soon after helium mining developed at the turn of the century, and eventually prompted the US government to establish the National Helium Reserve in 1925. The reserve holds about one billion cubic meters – or about half of the world's helium reserves – underground in the porous rock of an unused natural gas field 30 miles north of Amarillo, TX. This strategic reserve came in handy during World War II, since helium was a major component of military airships. The National Helium Reserve became even more important during the Cold War, since helium is used to purge rocket fuel in intercontinental ballistic missiles. Once the government decided to sell off the strategic reserves in 1996, the market was flooded with cheap helium, causing the price of helium – which is non-renewable, like oil and natural gas – to fall through the floor. The artificially low prices were exacerbated by the government's insistence on selling off the entire reserve by 2015, regardless of price. "The basic problem is that helium is too cheap," says Nobel laureate Robert Richardson, professor of physics at Cornell University. "The Earth is 4.7 billion years old and it has taken that long to accumulate our helium reserves, which we will dissipate in about 100 years. One generation does not have the right to determine availability forever." In fact, helium is so cheap right now that one of its largest consumers, NASA, makes no attempt to recycle the helium used to clean its rocket fuel tanks. Why would they if it's cheaper to just buy more helium? Professor Richardson, who believes the price of helium should rise between 20- to 50-fold to make recycling more worthwhile, cochaired an inquiry convened by the US National Research Council. The council, which is a part of the National Academy of Science, concluded that the federal government should reconsider its policy of selling off the US national helium reserve irrespective of the market price. As of 2011, the US Geological Survey estimated that the total worldwide volume of extractable helium amounts to 51.9 billion m3, with supply concentrated in seven countries: US, Algeria, Canada, China, Qatar, Poland, and Russia. The US is by far the world's leading helium producer, with over 77% of the world's helium extracted in 2011. The US is also the largest consumer, using roughly 56 million m3 of helium (or 2.0 billion ft3) in 2011. Much of the helium( as radioactive by-product formed in the Earth's crust) collects in natural gas deposits. But these trace amounts of helium are not worthwhile to recover at current prices; miners typically let the gas escape into the atmosphere. Only a large concentration – usually 0.3% or higher – is economically viable to retrieve. Companies that specialize in the sale of helium and other industrial gases, such as Praxair, Inc. (NYSE.PX) and Airgas Inc. (NYSE.ARG), could reap lucrative profits if the price of helium starts to skyrocket. Further, companies involved in the exploration of natural gas, including Chesapeake Energy (NYSE.CHK) and Devon Energy Corp. (NYSE.DVN), would likely start capturing helium that escapes when harvesting natural gas. However, private industry will have trouble keeping up with the government's basement prices: according to the US Geological Survey, the price the government charged in 2011 for crude helium was $2.70 per m3, while private industry had to charge nearly $6 per m3. As with any commodity, when the government ignores price signals and sets the price of a good below its market value, shortages are inevitable. Similar to the government's reaction to high gas prices in the 1970s when Nixon decreed that companies could not charge the market rate for oil, shortages followed. Allowing the government to dictate price only solves the demand problem, pushing the issue of limited supply onto businesses. By ignoring the role of price signals in the helium market, the US government is squandering a non-renewable resource that took billions of years to develop in just a few decades. Although the market will eventually readjust to higher prices, much of our finite helium supply will be wasted until the federal government alters its policy.

#### deterrence prevents the war

**Dratler 10** (Jay, Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property, Emeritus Ph.D. degrees in physics from the University of California (San Diego), and a J.D. degree from Harvard Law School, where he was articles editor of the Harvard Law Review. “The Case for Nuclear Proliferation” <http://jaydiatribe.blogspot.com/2010/04/case-for-nuclear-proliferation.html>, Donnie)

The strongest argument for nuclear proliferation is **not speculation, but history**. Since the first and only use of nuclear weapons (against Japan in 1945), no one has invaded a country that had them, with the possible exception of Israel. Besides brief border skirmishes, all significant armed conflicts **since 1945** but one have involved nuclear haves fighting in nuclear have-nots, or have-nots fighting among themselves. Here’s the list: 1947: India (have-not) and Pakistan (have-not) over partition and Kashmir (have not) 1950-53: North Korea (have-not) in South Korea (have-not) 1950-53: US (have) and allies in South Korea (have-not) against North Korea (have-not) and China (have) 1950-53: China (have) in North Korea (have-not) and South Korea (have-not) against US (have) 1954-63: France (have) in Indochina (have-not) 1965: India (have-not) in Pakistan (have-not) over Kashmir (have-not) 1967: Soviet Union (have) in Hungary (have-not) 1968: Soviet Union (have) in Czechoslovakia (have-not) 1971: India (have-not) in Pakistan (have-not), creating Bangladesh (have-not) 1964-75: US (have) in Vietnam (have-not) 1979-89: Soviet Union (have) in Afghanistan (have-not) 1982: UK (have) in Falklands (have-not) against Argentina (have-not) 1983: US (have) in Grenada (have-not) 1989: US (have) in Panama (have-not) 1991: US (have) in Iraq (have-not) (Operation Desert Storm) 1995: US (have) and NATO (have) in bombing campaign in Bosnia and Kosovo (have-nots) 2001-present: US (have) in Iraq (have-not) (Operation Iraqi Freedom) 2001-present: US (have) in Afghanistan (have-not) 2008: Russia (have) in Georgia (have-not) [Other colonial actions, which involved haves against colonized have-nots, are not listed. Nor are civil wars and conflicts in Africa, all of whose nations are nuclear have-nots.] The only exception known to me is Pakistan’s brief invasion of India (in 1999, over Kashmir, as usual). That invasion occurred when both nations had nuclear weapons. But **India’s strong conventional response and enormous international pressure stopped it.** Other possible but unproven exceptions involved foreign invasions of Israel in 1967 and 1973, when Israel may have had nuclear weapons but, if it did, didn’t reveal or use them. The conclusion that follows from this list in inescapable. Since the development of nuclear weapons, major powers possessing them (except for India and Pakistan) were too prudent or too civilized to make war among themselves. The unbroken record of military carnage that had preoccupied and devastated Eurasia and most of the “civilized” world for the previous two centuries stopped in its tracks. But the record of carnage continued in smaller countries lacking nuclear weapons, either because they fought among themselves, or (more often) because they were invaded or fought over by nuclear powers. Looking at these data, an unbiased observer has to conclude that nuclear weapons, with their unthinkable potential consequences, don’t cause wars. **They** **prevent them.** The destructive power of nuclear weapons is war’s reductio ad absurdum. It demonstrates graphically how pointless, senseless and useless war is. That is a lesson that Europe and the rest of the world should have learned (but didn’t) from World War I, a serious attempt at mutual genocide that accomplished absolutely nothing. Better late than never.

### Manufacturing

#### States would block the aff

EIA 01

(U.S. Natural Gas Markets: Mid-Term Prospects for Natural Gas Supply, Dec,

http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/natgas/chapter2.html)

Even if the Federal moratoria were lifted and offshore leasing activity resumed in Federal waters, States and nongovernmental entities in opposition to offshore oil and gas development could use other legal means to preclude or at least limit the extent of Federal offshore oil and gas exploration and production. Although the States and local governments can not directly prohibit the physical development of offshore oil and gas resources in Federal waters, it would be possible to make their development considerably more expensive. A primary method for accomplishing this would be to preclude or limit the development of oil and gas infrastructure within the jurisdiction of the State and local governments by use of restrictive zoning. The oil and gas infrastructure necessary to develop Federal offshore energy resources include many elements, such as harbor facilities, onshore separation and treatment plants, oil refineries, and pipelines for transporting the crude oil and natural gas onshore. For the purposes of this analysis it is assumed that local infrastructure issues and other potential non-Federal impediments would be overcome if Federal access restrictions were lifted, and that oil and gas development would proceed at rates similar to those seen in the early development of currently accessible areas.

#### No supply shock – they ignores tech advances and current increases.

Hurdle 2012

John, AOL Energy, Are US Shale Gas Resources Overstated? Part 2, December 5 2012, http://energy.aol.com/2012/12/05/are-us-shale-gas-resources-overstated-part-2/

Potential Gas Committee executive director John Curtis rejected Berman's reliance on the committee's "probable" category, which is based on gas in existing fields. "He's dead wrong," Curtis said, arguing that restricting the resource estimate to only "probable" gas ignores the existence of highly productive plays like the Marcellus and the Haynesville that were not initially included in that category because they had not been drilled. Curtis added that any deficit between a field's actual production and its resource estimate may reflect a lack of pipelines or undeveloped markets for the gas rather than a resource that undershoots expectations. The PGC's latest estimate, published in 2010, is for total US shale resource of 687 tcf, including "probable", "possible" and "speculative" gas. Including all categories of gas, the committee estimated a total resource of 1,900 tcf, not far below the EIA's assessment of 2,203 tcf. Ahead of the next PGC report, due in April 2013, Curtis said there was no indication of a need to cut its current estimate of gas resources, and there had not been in 2010 compared with the previous report two years earlier. The Thorny Issue of Reserve Estimates "From year-end 2008 to year-end 2010 we saw no reason to move away from our position for the quality and quantity of resources, and from 2010 to now we still do not," he said. For his part, Powers cited the EIA's own data in support of his case, noting that the organization sharply cut its estimate of unproved technically recoverable resource to 482 tcf in the latest outlook from 827 tcf a year earlier, largely because of a big decline in its TRR estimate for the Marcellus Shale to 141 tcf from 410 tcf a year earlier. "The EIA is starting to walk back from its earlier claims," Powers said, in an interview ahead of the book's scheduled publication in May 2013. He said the EIA's credibility was hurt when it cut its Marcellus estimate after the US Geological Survey calculated in its own 2011 study that the Appalachian shale play contained just 84 tcf. Philip Budzik, a spokesman for the EIA, said the changing estimates reflect the industry's increasing experience in the field. "The numbers have been changing significantly over the last couple of years," he said. "Producers have been experimenting with drilling and completion techniques." Any confirmed cut in US shale gas resources could have far-reaching consequences ranging from reduced energy security to more greenhouse gas emissions and higher energy costs. With increased production and optimistic projections for recoverable resources, natural gas is assuming an increasingly important role in US energy policy. The EIA estimated the TRR for all forms of natural gas including tight gas and coal bed methane is 2,203 tcf, or about a century's supply at the current national consumption rate of some 24 tcf a year. Shale gas represents about a quarter of the EIA's total, or around 22 years' worth; that resource would shrink to just 5.5 years if Powers is right. Dan Whitten, a spokesman for the trade group America's Natural Gas Alliance, rejected Powers's estimates, saying that shale gas production has risen more than 12-fold over the last decade, and estimates of recoverable resources have risen at a similar rate. Whitten said Powers's assertions have been refuted by prominent organizations including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Potential Gas Committee. "There is no question, with continued advances in both the technology used to produce natural gas and our understanding of resource potential, that projections will continue to evolve," Whitten wrote in an email. "While we have not seen Mr. Powers' book, his conclusions run counter to the established science on the abundance of natural gas."

#### Energy costs don’t matter.

Levi 2012

Michael, CFR Fellow, Oil and Gas Euphoria Is Getting Out of Hand, May 7 2012, https://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/05/07/oil-and-gas-euphoria-is-getting-out-of-hand/

Once again, these sorts of claims have become increasingly common. Indeed the quantitative assertions are perfectly plausible. But the big picture implications don’t make sense. As of 2010, total sales of U.S. manufactured goods were about five trillion dollars. At the same time, the sector spent about 100 billion dollars on energy. That’s a mere two percent of total sales. You could slash energy costs to zero, and it would barely move the needle for most U.S. manufacturers. There are, of course, exceptions, like some iron, steel, cement, and paper makers. But even these industries care about much more than their electricity prices. Will lower energy costs move things at the margin? Of course they will, and that’s good news. But they are nowhere close to what’s needed for U.S. manufacturing to broadly thrive. So let’s take a step back, because these disagreements aren’t just academic. They matter for at least three big reasons. There is a real risk that policymakers, wrongly convinced that surging supply has solved all U.S. energy vulnerabilities, will neglect the demand side of the equation. But the basic reality hasn’t changed: more supply can help, but to fundamentally reduce U.S. vulnerability to the vagaries of world energy markets, we need to rein in our extraordinary (and economically self-damaging) demand.

#### Alt causes to renaissance now and not key to growth.

Mallaby 2013

Sebastian, Director of the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies and Paul A. Volcker Senior Fellow for International Economics, American Industry Is on the Move, Financial Times, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/american-industry-move/p29785?cid=rss-fullfeed-american\_industry\_is\_on\_the\_mo-010813&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+cfr\_main+%28CFR.org+-+Main+Site+Feed%29

Despite much fashionable chatter, this is not mainly about fracking. The new extraction technology has cut the price of natural gas in the US to a fraction of the Asian level, but, as the McKinsey Global Institute observed recently, the industries that are most energy-intensive are not actually very trade-intensive. US paper mills and oil refineries will enjoy the cheap gas bonanza but not much production in these sectors is likely to shift to US shores. The more important technological jolt comes under the heading of "big data". On Friday an exhaustive survey of management practices at 30,000 US manufacturing establishments was released. Two of the authors, Nick Bloom and John Van Reenen , had previously shown that US companies were, on average, better managed than foreign rivals. A striking conclusion of their study is that US manufacturers continue to get better, particularly when it comes to capturing and analysing data on everything from customer behaviour to production-line efficiencies. And there is plenty of scope to improve further. A minority of survey respondents embraced most state-of-the-art management incentives and monitored performance against clear targets. But a quarter of respondents adopted fewer than half of these practices. So the stage is at least half set for a US manufacturing revival, even if obstacles – poor education, poor infrastructure – remain. But what might a revival mean? Not, unfortunately, a cure for unemployment. Since a trough in January 2010, the US has generated just over half a million new manufacturing jobs but the bounce mostly reflects the collapse during the recession. For an advanced economy to create manufacturing employment independently of a cyclical rebound is almost unheard of. Even as it boosted manufacturing as a share of output between 1993 and 2007, Sweden lost almost a 10th of its manufacturing jobs.

#### Manufacturing not key to the economy

Wessel 12 (David Wessel, economics editor of The Wall Street, “Manufacturing Industry Gained Momentum In 2011,” 1-19-12, <http://www.npr.org/2012/01/19/145437593/are-more-u-s-manufacturing-jobs-being-created>)

WESSEL: Well, that's a good question. So basically, factories have added more than 300,000 jobs in the past two years, and that's pretty good news - certainly better than losing jobs. But it would take two million more jobs to get manufacturing back to where it was in 2007 before the recession. Factories are managing to produce more without hiring a lot more workers, because they're getting more productive; technology, reorganization, making people work harder, making them work smarter. It's all made for a remarkable surge of productivity. Factories get 40 percent more output out of every out of work today, compared to what they got 10 years ago. MONTAGNE: Still though, if sales keep growing, would factories not hire more? Maybe not as many workers as they had before, but more, and couldn't that be one part of the answer, at least, to the jobs problem? WESSEL: Well, it would definitely be one part, but it's a small part. For all the romance about manufacturing, we are no longer a manufacturing economy when it comes to jobs. Only nine percent of the jobs in America today are in manufacturing. It just isn't big enough to put Americans back to work. Even if factory employment doubled, which isn't going to happen, that wouldn't be enough new jobs to put all the 13 million unemployed people back to work. So yes, it's a plus. But no, it's not enough to solve our unemployment problem.

#### Domestic politics means the US won’t exercise hegemony – means no impact.

Kupchan 2011

Charles A., professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, The false promise of unipolarity: constraints on the exercise of American power, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 24, Number 2, June 2011

A final chink in the armour of Brooks and Wohlforth concerns their disregard of domestic politics in the United States. As realists, the authors consider unproblematic potential variation in the choices that Americans may make about how to deploy their preponderant power; the United States is the unipole, and will act accordingly. But just as political choice and practice in China, Russia, or Europe can alter the characteristics of unipolarity, so too can political choice in the United States.With the collapse of America’s political centre and the erosion of bipartisanship on matters of foreign policy, US statecraft may prove far more unpredictable and unsteady than during the decades since World War II (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007a). Brooks and Wohlforth do to some extent address the issue of domestic stewardship when they examine whether the Iraq War and US unilateralism constrained US power due to reputational concerns and the loss of legitimacy. The excesses of the Bush administration’s brand of unilateralism, they contend, cost the United States little in terms of its influence abroad. With its surfeit of power, the United States could afford to make mistakes. The challenge in this decade, however, may be not too much US power and resolve, but an unsteady America that grows weary of the burdens of unipolarity. Brooks and Wohlforth assume that the United States will as a matter of course continue to deploy its preponderant power on a global basis; the unipole will automatically defend unipolarity. But in the aftermath of the draining wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic duress and ballooning deficits associated with the global financial crisis, the United States may lose some of its enthusiasm for serving as the global guardian of last resort. Democrats and Republicans are divided on issues ranging from the war in Afghanistan to climate change to arms control. If a political compromise is to be struck, it may well entail fashioning a more modest and less costly strategy of retrenchment (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007b). At a minimum, US grand strategy may swing between stark alternatives depending upon which party is in power. In broad terms, the Republicans favour the use of force and shun institutionalized multilateralism. Meanwhile, the Democrats favour multilateralism and engagement rather than the exercise of force. Even if unipolarity persists, its international effects may be overridden by the unpredictable choices Americans may make about when and how to deploy their national power.

#### ---Economic decline does not cause war.

Miller 2000

Morris, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### ---Economic decline creates a structural incentive for military caution --- Makes politicians sensitive to backlash.

Boehmer 2007

Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”

The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participation in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.

### ov

#### Conceded the hillyard ev- independent extinction event- assumption of PRODUCTION and not consumptive patterns make extinction inevitable.

#### ---National energy policy debates are located within a false methodology of a unified energy system which eliminates consumptive limits. The affirmative’s imagination of future energy production is a coping mechanism for anxiety over impending catastrophe. If all energy inputs are connected then political context becomes irrelevant and a future of utopian abundance is merely a question of planning proper technocratic management.

Mason 2006

Arthur, Department of Anthropology @ University of Calgary, Images of the energy future, Environ. Res. Lett. 1 (2006) 014002 (4pp), http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/1/1/014002/pdf/1748-9326\_1\_1\_014002.pdf

Today’s images of the energy future derive their possibility from the 1970s’ energy crisis when, as a result of a semantic shift in the energy industry, technical prediction in the managerial sciences became linked to particular modes of communicative understanding. Roughly 35 years ago a shift occurred in the description of the US energy supply system as a whole. The energy supply system in the US began to be characterized by its own limitations for development. Policy analysts working at the level of individual ﬁrms and of the broader interactions of the energy system with society announced that growth in the system was coming to an end. The Limits to Growth is the title of one report released by MIT in 1972 [11]. Such talk on the limits of development appeared in association with discussion itself of a US energy supply system. That is, of a supply system expressed in the singular. Previously, energy supply consisted of arenas understood in more individualistic terms, such as nuclear, coal, natural gas, oil, and electricity. Each arena achieved its autonomy and singularity on the basis of certain unique (non-transferable) characteristics including, for example, the historical period during which an object of energy evolved into a mass-produced commodity. After the 1970s, these technically self-sufﬁcient and historically self-enclosed arenas came to be expressed by their sum, in terms of the ‘national energy supply system’ [12]. The term ‘system’ as deﬁned during this period by sociologist Talcott Parsons refers to components (institutional, technical) that are related by a network of interconnection, the state or activity of one component inﬂuencing the state or activity of other components. Thus, a shift to a national energy supply ‘system’ suggests that some change in the arrangement of the energy supply arenas had taken place [13]. One need only look to the creation in the mid-1970s of the US Department of Energy (DOE) to identify this new conﬁguration. Following the Nixon Administration’s attempt to unify energy organization and planning, the Carter Administration in 1977 signed into law the Department of Energy Organization Act. The Act might well be considered the ﬁrst real artifact of this semantic shift. It was the instrument for collapsing various government agencies and programs into a single department. The newly established DOE would administer the energy functions of the federal government while providing a framework for a comprehensive national energy plan. With talk of the national energy supply system, discussion on the limits of development shifted to the search for solutions through management of the future. During the 1960s, futures research had become popular through the Delphi technique developed by the RAND corporation in Santa Monica, California, which addressed questions about military potential and political issues as well as strategic planning of the business corporation. This was the ‘era in which society had become future-oriented in its thinking’ wrote sociologist Daniel Bell at the time [14]. At the Department of Energy, the future began to be drawn into the present from the work taking place in the afﬁliated but autonomous research division called the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The purpose of the EIA, which still operates, is to generate reliable data and methods and to produce relevant energy supply forecasts 2 . Today, analysts from some of the more well-known private consulting ﬁrms, including Cambridge Energy mentioned above, began their careers as EIA economists. With establishment of the EIA, the US government provided the nation with its ﬁrst comprehensive program from which to produce forecasts on the nation’s energy supply system. Previously, government had collected various energy price surveys, some dating back to the 1930s. There were also data gathered from energy production sites and which were ‘housed’ in the Bureau of Mines as well as other ‘pots of data’ that were known to exist within labor statistics [16]. The EIA program of forecasting, in some sense, also originates during the Nixon Administration, in particular, through establishment of what was referred to at the time as Project Independence Evaluations System or PIES (renamed Midterm Energy Market Model during the Carter Administration). According to one member of the initial cohort of EIA economists, the PIES was ‘a big economic model of how to get to the future, of how the future could happen. And the model was independent [of politics]’ [17]. Stanford University economist William Hogan, who is now at Harvard, was the lead developer of PIES 3 . During this period, the economist’s role in the service of government was still in its infancy. In particular, the application of cost-beneﬁt analysis in decision-making only started making inroads into government when, within the arena of environmental regulation, a shift occurred from juridical evaluation to favoring economic efﬁciency through mathematical models. The introduction of this shift, which was later to be called reform, was especially welcomed in the arenas of energy production where industry sought to leaven the ‘dead hand of regulation’, as the true nature of the 1970s’ energy supply crisis was already being referred to by policy analysts of the time [19]. One last event taking place during this period which strikes me as important is the English translation of Knowledge and Human Interests (KHI), written by J¨urgen Habermas, who ﬁrst published the book several years earlier in Germany. Its English translation in 1972, incidentally, coincides with the same year of MIT’s release of the report The Limits to Growth mentioned earlier. In KHI, Habermas divides the sciences into three spheres: those with an interest in technical prediction and control, as in the natural sciences but also in the managerial sciences; those with an interest in communicative understanding, as in the humanities; and those interested in emancipation, as in Western Marxism [20]. By comparison to topics with similar titles of the period, the observations of Habermas are not unique. American scholars from various leanings had for several years been raising alarms about the fate of a society which, from that point on, was expected to be run by a ‘new class’ of technocratic intelligentsia and humanistic intellectuals whose authority rested in their theoretical knowledge [21]. The English translation, thus, can be seen as a decision by American publishers to increase the circulation of narratives that identify a speciﬁc group whose expertise is the basis of their engagement in modernizing society. The need to promote a class of modernizing experts may itself be a reaction to discussions emerging at the time, some conservative, but others more populist, that highlight the role of technology in society in less formal terms, for example, as the art of (self) maintenance [22]. At any rate, I believe the work by Habermas is signiﬁcant because it represents a horizon line after which the sciences of technical prediction begin to merge with the sciences of communicative understanding. Evidence is seen from the proliferation of consulting ﬁrms in the wake of energy market restructuring, when the advisory service (e.g., scenario planning) of consultants comes to be valued by government and industry leaders as the ‘sum total of what everyone knows’ [23]. It is from this slim epoch then—an era of ‘just prior’ to regulatory reform, a period of inchoate knowledges, of a new managerial science of prediction, the introduction of microeconomic theory to regulation and the advent of energy market restructuring—**that I situate the origin of today’s representations of the energy future**. To be sure, earlier images of the energy future circulate. Electricity production at the turn of the twentieth century and, in particular, its promotion at trade fairs resulted in a multitude of futuristic images [24]. And this focus on the energy future was contemporaneous with the idea of a science of administration (relating to the expanding social sciences), governmentality and other forms of ‘constructive social control’ emblematic of the period [25]. Yet, in these images a neo-classical past always penetrates the consciousness of what deﬁnes the present. What is absent is the transparency of a set of knowledges that can extend into the future out of the present. It is precisely these knowledges,or early forms of them, that become the rationalities through which an energy future emerges from its limits to growth during the 1970s to a post-2000 period in which the slogan is ‘reaching for global frontiers’ [26]. To what end can the aesthetic fascination for images of the energy future lead? Ulrich Beck has written skillfully on the role of knowledge about the future in organizing present activity [27]. He notes that the relevance of a projected cause, a projected variable, and a projected outcome, is directly proportional to their perceived threat. Thus, the future, once intertwined with notions of progress, is now synonymous with terminologies of risk. We are caught up in defensive battles of various types, anticipating the hostile substances in all manners of living. Efforts to manage risk have become an open-ended, future-oriented project, the goal of which is not to confront a concrete dangerous situation, but to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption of danger. As such, Risk Society (the title of Beck’s work), is a theme that concerns the topic of decay. As Mitchell writes, we are now acutely aware of the will of things to become more disorderly, to seek entropy, and minimum sense. **The modernist anxiety over the collapse of structure has been replaced by the ‘panic over uncontrolled growth of structures’** [28]. Perhaps **the drama** and character **of today’s** images of the energy future lie in their capacity for governing over the decay of the present**. The images,** much like the tax incentives on energy development in US Congress, **slide the present into** a state of ‘accelerated depreciation’ in the hopes of projecting ourselves rapidly into the future**.**

### FW

#### The roll of the ballot is to vote for the best act of knowledge production, the judge is a critic of argument---this is best,

#### a.) debate realism: the plan won’t happen if you vote aff, all you are doing is endorsing a particular educational model, the only portable skill we get from debate is advocacy skills, voting aff means they are doing the better advocating for change, voting neg means they are doing a bad job.

#### If we win any of our link arguments it means they are not doing the better debating because they train us to be good energy forecasters for shell oil which is bad, they assume energy is a homogenous entity where any combination of interchange can occur, that causes energy shortages, resource wars and serial policy failure.

#### b.) the political Our links also turn their policy making good offense, they will result in bad policies and collapse the political by having a solely supply based solution to the energy problem, assuming the only thing that need be changed out of our consumption, infrastructure and mindset problems is our supply brackets off key political discussions and deemphasizes genuine contestation.

#### c.) A focus on policy relevance precludes the structural change necessary to establish energy security for more than just the privileged few.

Levy 2012

Gabriel, Deconstructing “energy security”: some questions, People and Nature, http://peopleandnature.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/deconstructing-energy-security-some-questions/

– On the other hand, the report repeatedly refers to “policymakers” – which to my mind is a generalisation almost as woolly and meaningless as “energy security”. Usually, this word conjours up a picture of besuited smart-alecs in parliamentary offices: the politicians, the assistants who work for them, the academics who construct arguments for them and the lobbyists who lobby them. The idea that such people will effect social change is ridiculous. More insidious, though, is the danger that social movements will get channelled into narrow “political” campaigns, inspired by illusions that “policymakers” can at least be our levers … whereas the big issues posed by the report – e.g. the achievement of energy security as the use of energy by all – can only be addressed by much more sweeping social transformations.

#### ---Focusing on energy production creates a policymaking euphoria that distracts from real lived experiences in favor of technical management that precludes political change.

Byrne & Toly 2006

John, director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (CEEP) and Distinguished Professor of Public Policy at the University of Delaware, Noah, research associate and Ph.D. candidate in the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy at the University of Delaware, Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse, *Transforming Power: Energy, Environment and Society in Conflict*, pg 1-3

With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector’s performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of “energy futures” that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices. One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power who, early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg, 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner “too cheap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, cited in the *New York Times* 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the “magical fire” or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize “inherently safe reactors” (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in “sustainable energy alternatives” that constitute a second euphoric steam. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, “green” energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy “haves” and “have-nots.” In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291), “today’s nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people” as “micropower meets village power.” Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a “solar global economy… can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world’s cultural diversity” (Scheer, 2002: 34). The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet’s climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime’s operations. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume *Myth of the Machine*, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (1934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a life-harming dead end (1961: 263, 248): …an orgy of uncontrolled production and equally uncontrolled reproduction: machine fodder and cannon fodder: surplus values and surplus populations… The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity—here are the enemies. The living organism demands a life-sustaining environment. Modernity’s formula for two centuries has been to increase energy in order to produce overwhelming economic growth. While diagnosing the inevitable failures of this logic, Mumford nevertheless warned that modernity’s supporters would seek to derail present-tense evaluations of the era’s social and ecological performance with forecasts of a bountiful future in which, finally, the perennial social conflicts over resources would end. Contrary to traditional notions of democratic governance, Mumford observed that the modern ideal actually issues from a pseudomorph that he named the “democratic-authoritarian bargain” (1964: 6). In which the modern energy regime and capitalist political economy join in a promise to produce “every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus [one] may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted minority” on the condition that society demands only what the regime is capable and willing to offer. An authoritarian energy order thereby constructs an aspirational democracy while facilitating the abstraction of production and consumption from non-economic social values. The premise of the current energy paradigms are in need of critical study in the manner of Mumford’s work if a world measurably different from the present order is to be organized. Interrogating modern energy assumptions, this chapter examines the social projects of both conventional and sustainable energy as a beginning effort in this direction. The critique explores the neglected issue of the political economy of energy, underscores the patterns of democratic failure in the evolution of modern energy, and considers the discursive continuities between the premises of conventional and sustainable energy futures.

#### Policy framing determines energy policy --- Empirical studies conclude framing defines implementation and policy response.

Pralle & Boscarino 2011

Sarah, Jessica, Framing Trade-offs: The Politics of Nuclear Power and Wind Energy in the Age of Global Climate Change, Review of Policy Research, Volume 28, Issue 4, pages 323–346

Policy scholars have spent considerable effort attempting to understand strategies of issue framing and their impact on the policy process. The concept of framing has been summarized by Callaghan and Schnell (2005, p. 2) as the “process by which all political players, including the media, use linguistic cues to define and give meaning to issues and connect them to the larger political environment. . . . Essentially, frames set the boundaries of public policy debates.” Frames, like a photographer's lens, focus on some aspects of reality while minimizing, obscuring, or excluding other aspects. As such, they suggest a particular way of thinking about a public problem or solution by defining what the essential issue is (Kinder, 2003; see also Entman, 1993). Frames are strategically employed by political actors; however, they also exist as cognitive structures which, according to Kinder and Nelson (2005, p. 103), “provide order and meaning, making the world beyond direct experience seem natural.” Research in political communications points to the power of frames in shaping people's policy opinions and preferences. Several decades of “framing effects” research shows that individuals' attitudes and opinions about policy issues can vary depending on what aspect of an issue is emphasized (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). In the policy field, scholars have suggested that different frames can lead to different levels of interest and attention to a problem, increased or decreased mobilization around an issue, and support for (or opposition to) policy reform (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Stone, 1988). For Riker (1986), reframing is a key way that legislators and other policymakers try to structure a conflict so they can win. By introducing a new dimension to an issue, policy makers may be able to attract new supporters and therefore change the balance of power in favor of one's preferred policy. A real-world example of this is when anti-death penalty activists introduced a new “innocence” frame into the debate over capital punishment, which over time influenced public opinion and led to decreases in state executions (Baumgartner, De Boef, & Boydstun, 2008). Much of the policy framing literature examines how policy makers and advocacy groups attempt to reframe particular policy issues by emphasizing some aspects of an issue over others, or by re-categorizing problems. But there is another aspect of framing that receives less attention, what we might call decision frames or what Pralle (2006b) refers to as policy principles. A policy principle is the stated or unstated, formal or informal basis upon which policy makers deliberate and make decisions. These principals provide rationales and mental frameworks which policy makers and the public may use to reach a decision on a particular policy matter, such as whether to support a proposed policy solution or not.

### predictions

#### ---Imagining solutions to scenarios of global energy crisis serves as a numbing device preserving a childish naiveté that encourages us to fiddle while the planet burns --- The inherent tension between their imminent scenarios for extinction and the at least decade long timeframe before education can induce material change reveals the affirmative’s commitment to the status quo.

Sumrell & Varnelis 2009

Robert, production designer, educator, writer & teaches at the Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, Kazys, Director of the Network Architecture Lab at the Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, Personal Lubricants: Shell Oil and Scenario Planning, New Geographies 2: Landscapes of Energy, pg 127-132

Suddenly, everything's grim. In the face of the current global environmental and financial crisis, the future no longer promises boundless economic growth and technological innovation, but resembles a strangely familiar landscape fraught with potential danger and imminent collapse. lf green shoots offer hope, only the most naive proceed with the reckless abandon of previous years. Global economic crises-like the Great Depression and the stagflation of the late 1960s and early 1970s-are tied to the internal contradictions of capitalism; overinvestment and overproduction produce an unsustainable bubble that eventually bursts. After a crash, overproduction typically inspires a shift in planning from the physical to the temporal. Realizing that it did not plan ahead properly, society concerns itself not with designing and producing things but rather with drawing up plans to safeguard that such crises do not recur in the future. Manfredo Tafuri observes that during the Great Depression, such a shift forced the avant-garde to understand that only economic planning, not physical planning, could cure the problems of modern life: "architecture as the ideology of the Plan is swept away by the reality of the Plan the moment the plan came down from utopia and became an operant mechanism."lTafuri himself wrote in 1969, at the staft of the second great crisis of the twentieth century, a new era of limlts when modern architecture itself was called into question. As architects turn, once again, to temporal planning, we need to come to an understanding of the deeper significance of such methodologies. ln this essay, we examine the history of one such approach, scenario planning. By the postwar era, Royal Dutch/Shell Oil was a diverse body of allied companies with stakes in oil, natural gas, hydrocarbons, petrochemicals, agriculture, and plastics. Under the planned economy of high Fordism, a long sustained boom led to an explosion of automobile ownership and use that drove huge growth for Shell. As one of the “Seven Sisters,” Shell was one of the world’s largest petroleum companies, but it was also the smallest of these and chronically extracted more oil than it added to its reserves. Shell realized it needed a strategy to direct its future growth. Since the end of World War II, both the price of oil and the growth in demand had been remarkably stable, and few oil executives had the foresight to imagine that things would ever change. By the late 1960s, Shell had developed a complex forecasting tool called the Unified Planning Machinery to predict growth in energy demand and upcoming oil prices. UPM-derived strategy used previous sales and cost projections to anticipate the price of crude and demand in detail for one year and more generally for six years. Using that information, the company could generate strategies for investment in infrastructure as well as for trade. Although the UPM was effective when crude prices were stable and demand was steadily rising, it was not flexible enough to anticipate adverse events that could affect the company outside of its general business operations. By the early 1960s most senior Shell executives had experience only with a long economic boom, but threats were mounting. Not only was overproduction looming, but also overt European colonialism was coming to an end and with it, the loss of Western control over oil reserves in the developing world. Realizing that even in this time of growth, the landscape was quickly changing, some employees of the Shell planning department – among them Ted Newland – sought more flexible methods of planning for uncertainty in the future, and turned to the scenario planning methods devised by Herman Kahn and the Hudson Institute. A decade before, at the RAND Corporation, Kahn began using systems theory and game theory to model the effects of massive nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Kahn did not just employ standard projections. Instead, he wrote multiple histories of near future events as if from a more distant future vantage point. Instead of accurate forecasts, however, Kahn sought to write compelling fictions demonstrating threats and opportunities together with the means by which his audience could anticipate them. These scenarios, Kahn believed, served as myths for the modern day. Literary qualities were so important to Kahn that later, at the Hudson Institute, he hired novelist William Gaddis to rewrite the institute’s reports. To describe such stories, Leo Rosten, another writer who freelanced at RAND, suggested the term “scenario,” a poetic but antiquated term that Hollywood employed to refer to screenplays during silent movie days. Kahn loved the term precisely for its evocation of poetry and myth-making. The two decades at the state of the Cold War were marked by a fervent interest in the future. Science fiction of this era was generally optimistic about our ability to solve problems with technology. By the late 1950s, however, sharp advances in everyday technology, a proliferation of commercial goods, and futuristic military and space technologies closed the gap with science fiction. Modernization was complete. If this diluted modernism permeated everything. Utopian projections were no longer plausible. It was time to envision the future again, outside of Utopia, this time not as a radically different whole but from the contemporary condition or even from an imagined past. Still, the Cold War was a time of deep instability and individuals needed fantasy to comprehend the difficulties of the world. Carl Jung’s practice of analytical psychology became popular, especially in art and literature, offering a system of archetypes and the symbolic use of dreams, fairly tales, and myths to comprehend the world. Also during this period, J. R. R. Tolkien completed The Lord of the Rings trilogy while C. S. Lewis wrote The Chronicles of Narnia. Together, both works established the modern genre of fantasy writing while making clear the importance and difficulty of epic struggles between good and evil. Similarly, Walt Disney left behind the familiar, comical animated adventures of Mickey Mouse, Goofy, and Donald Duck for the more romantic visions of Cinderella and Sleeping Beauty, fairy tales he appropriated from the Brothers Grimm. The potential of nuclear war threatened to end the future itself, a possibility made vivid by Nevil Shute, an aeronautical engineer, in his 1957 On the Beach. Shute described the effects of fallout after a massive war on the last survivors as devastating and inevitable, yet did so without any great expression of emotion: characters generally took pleasure in small things and waited for the end. Kahn found On the Beach an “interesting, but badly researched book.” Still, the novel broke new ground by imagining what had previously been deemed to horrible to think. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, U.S. nuclear policy was based on the idea that the country’s capability for massive retaliation with nuclear weapons made both conventional and limited nuclear war unthinkable for the Soviet Union. Using game theory to prove his point, Kahn argued otherwise. First, he suggested that the policy of massive retaliation encouraged the Soviet Union to launch a first strike to disable the United States’ ability to strike. Second, he argued that when pressed, neither country would engage in all-out war and, even if they did, life-and with it, warfare-would continue afterward, however damaged. As forecasting life past a nuclear holocaust was considered unthinkable at the time, Kahn called his projections "thinking the unthinkable"' He concluded that the United States should avoid threatening nuclear war, ensure a second-strike capability to adequately deter further aggression, and draft plans for continuing war after a nuclear exchange. Kahn's 1961 book, On Thermonuclear War, galvanized both policymakers and the public. Kahn's projections compelled John E Kennedy's Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to shift U. S. military strategy to the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, which relied on a second-strike capability. In part, Kahn's success was due not only to his argument but also to his intense but comic presentation style. Kahn would frequently joke about nuclear war to get the audience's attention and keep them listening. Many, however, were disturbed by the very topic and outraged by Kahn's propensity to joke about nuclear war. A rival military strategist at RAND, Bernard Brodie, advocated massive retaliation, believing it necessary to keep nuclear war unthinkable. For him, Kahn's project was grotesque, an improper coupling: "Something [was] illegitimately in something else ...Things that should be kept apart [were] fused together." ln contrast, the founder of communitarianism, Amitai Etzioni, applauded him: "Kahn does for nuclear arms what free-love advocates did for sex: he speaks candidly of acts which others whisper behind close doors.” As Etzioni observed, horror and disgust at thinking the unthinkable galvanized opposition to nuclear war. Stanley Kubrick would echo Kahn's tactics in his 1964 black comedy, Dr. Strangelove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, even as he immortalized Kahn as (at least a partial inspiration for) the character of film's Dr. Strangelove.l0 The Limits to Growth Amid growing tensions with RAND, Kahn left and founded the Hudson lnstitute. There, he investigated nonmilitary futures and honed a doctrine of futurology that posited unending growth for capitalism and technology.tl The first decade of work at the Hudson lnstitute culminated in the 1967 book, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years, set out to identify the challenges faced by the United States from a changing geopolitical context and the transitions to a postindustrial society. Soon, The Year 2000 began to circulate at Shell and with it the idea that the world's demand for oil would rise exponentially by the end of the century. Beginning in the late 1960s, Shell's London based planning group, led by Ted Newland and Pierre Wack, began generating scenarios to understand risks-both political and general. Newland and Kahn soon became friends. After successfully convincing Shell's Committee of Managing Directors that the UPM could not adequately cope with such changes, Newland assembled a team to generate scenarios.1 ln 1971, Newland was joined in Shell's Planning Department by Pierre Wack. Trained as a public administrator, Wack was a disciple of the mystic G. l. Gurdjieff during World War ll. Gurdjieff believed that people lived their lives in a state close to somnambulism and sought to teach his disciples how to wake up and see the world. One way of doing this. Gurdjieff suggested, was to seek out "remarkable peoplel'r3 Similarly, Wack believed that turning to conventional sources was a mistake, as they were already well known to the stakeholders involved. He found one of these remarkable people in Kahn, whose writings he had become acquainted and whom he had visited at the Hudson lnstitute.14 To understand the fate of oil in the year 2000, Newland assembled a team in Shell's Group Planning division to map the risks by developing six initial scenarios. Unlike Kahn, the scenario planners at Shell sought not the big picture but rather a focused vision of the future for oil. Even more than Kahn's faith in the powers of scenarios as fictional devices, Wack and Newland believed in the mythological role of scenarios that had the compelling and memorable qualities of fairy tales. Shell planner Arie de Geus would write "ln the telling ..., the story line becomes stronger. Scenarios act as a signal-to-noise filter. The driving forces sharpen. The events depicted enter the mind with less background noise and thus with a stronger profile and clearer outlines."ls One scenario focused on the changing ownership of energy supplies. Prior to the foundation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1960s, oil reserves were divided among three regions, the United States (which had import restrictions), the self-sufficient communist world, and everywhere else, known simply as the "international oil industry" or "the World Outside the Communist Area and North America" (WOCANA).16Within the WOCANA nations, national interests owned only 8 percent of their crude oil, with the rest owned by the Seven Sisters as well as a few aspiring independents. lt quickly became clear to Wack and Newland that the oil industry could lose its control over oil prices in many of the WOCANA nations. Shell's directors agreed that a crisis in oil production would come, but were unwilling to break with the path followed by the oil companies and stuck steadfastly to UPM projections. Wack was disturbed by this and realized that their scenarios were too prosaic. Scenarios had to, he concluded, make it possible to "change our managers' view of reality."l7 ln other words, scenario planning was important less as an analytical tool and more as a rhetorical device. Scenario planning, Peter Schwartz writes, merely allows people to see what they are blind to.18 A successful scenario, he explains, "resonates in some ways with what they already know, and then leads them from that resonance to reperceive the world."19 De Geus himself explains that scenario planning served as a form of transitional object, a term that he borrowed from psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott.2o For Winnicott, the transitional object designated "the intermediate area of experience, between the thumb and the teddy bear, between the oral erotism and the true object-relationship, between primary creative activity and projection of what has already been introjected." Not necessarily a thing at all, the transitional object is more often an action, a sound, or some other phenomena. As an intermediate condition, it provides a means by which the child moves from an oceanic phase to a grasp of the world and consciousness.2l But instead of a fetish, over time, such objects would be decathected, relegated to limbo after losing their meaning. Winnicott suggested that such objects "diffused...spread out over the ... whole cultural field!'z2 Here Winnicott could suggest a return: "lt is assumed here that the task of reality acceptance is never completed, that no human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and that relief from this strain is provided by an intermediate area of experience ... which is not challenged (arts, religion, etc.).This intermediate area is in direct continuity with the play area of the small child who is 'lost' in playl'23Thus for de Geus scenario planning served not so much to anticipate the future as to stimulate thought about it. Even after processing the scenarios. Shell did not anticipate an energy crisis from the seller's market before 1980 because of long-term contracts the major oil producers had signed with OPEC.24 Still, based on the results of the Year 2000 study, Shell diversified, expanding into coal and nuclear power generation and metal production. Shell made many aspects of its scenarios public, thus launching an international discussion on the looming "oil crisis." In America, there was reason for concern. The country's rapid economic growth during the preceding decades meant that internal oil production had not kept pace with demand, peaking in 1970. Although there was still oil within the country's borders, bringing it to the surface was not as cost effective as importing it. To ensure that the growing demand would continue to be met, the U.S. government slowly reduced its restrictions on imported oil until it finally abolished them in 1973, deepening American reliance on foreign oil.25 ln the ten years following 1968, oil imports to the United States increased 193 percent while domestic oil production dropped 3 percent. Both Shell and the industry were aware of this possibility decades beforehand. ln 1956, Marion King Hubbert, a geophysicist working in Shell's Houston office, predicted that the United States would reach peak oil production between 1965 and 1970 while the world would do so around the year 2000.26 Hubbert's predictions were deeply unpopular, so much so that after Shell's head office learned that he would be presenting his research at the American Petroleum lnstitute, representatives called to ask him to withdraw his presentation.2T Since it would have required a massive shift away from existing investments, Hubbert's work was simply too dramatic for oil companies to take seriously. Although Hubbert was ignored by Shell and the industry, the idea of a resource-limited future steadily became more acceptable. A group of public officials, economists. and scientists met in Rome in 1968 to examine the future broadly.They published their results in 1972 asThe Limits to Growth. Like Hubber1, the authors of the study concluded that global resource extraction-not only of oil, but also of many crucial metals-would peak around the year 2000. The Limits to Growth questioned the viability of the current rate of consumption of the planet's resources.28 For Shell, The Limits to Growth meant that the environmental question was no longer a set of localized issues and reactions but rather a global problem that affected the company's public image. By making public Newland and Wack's Year 2000 study, Shell appeared to be in the forefront of such thinking, but they still underestimated how quickly change would happen. The Arab-lsraeli crisis of 1973 triggered the anticipated crisis over non-Western controlled oil. The result was an increase in the price of a barrel of oil from $2.90 in September to $5.10 in December to $11.65 on January 1, 1974.30 The new geopolitical landscape prompted the U.S. government to seek new means of conservation and alternative energy sources to prevent American dependency on foreign oil. The potential drop in demand, it became clear, could be as dangerous to an oil company's bottom line as any threat from overseas. Shell's scenarios did not predict the events of the OPEC energy crisis or how soon a crisis would take place, but as their scenarios suggesting a potential shift of power in oil resources had been made public prior to the crisis unfolding, the company appeared to have anticipated it.31 Even though no specific management decisions could be directly attributed to Shell's use of scenarios, scenario planning was a convenient means of fostering an image of Shell as having anticipated the future.3 lmpressed by the relevance of theYear 2000 scenarios, Shell continued to employ the scenario plan strategy, and by 1977 the planning group was running a number of scenarios including one focusing on lran, where much of the Seven Sisters' remaining oil supply was located. Within the scenarios, they anticipated that growing fundamentalist sentiments could bring a shift in power, upsetting the region and possibly turning it against the West, thus causing a steep rise in oil prices.33 Again, sooner than Shell expected, events unfolded that caused a second oil crisis. The 1979 lranian revolution and the subsequent lran/lraq war caused barrel prices to double.3a Shell had already been looking to diversify its holdings further and pursue new sources of oil, particularly to offshore deposits identified in the 1960s. Until this second price spike, many of these options were too expensive to develop. The new oil prices made offshore drilling profitable, and soon Shell focused much of its attention to the offshore industry and construction of new types of rigs and platforms.35 This was widely perceived as Shell's second success with scenarios. Shell had risen from the least profitable to the most profitable of the Seven Sisters. The planning department was widely integrated into the corporate and management structure. Any major new projects taken on at Shell had to be run successfully against all of the ongoing scenarios, thereby attempting to guarantee that new plans would have as much success as possible, regardless of the way events unfold.36 The third oil crisis occurred as a combination of massive investments in supply infrastructure in the 1970s and cutbacks in demand due to energy conservation. ln 1986, prices collapsed and stayed low for some twenty years.37 Still, Shell's 1985 "Oil Price Collapse" scenario anticipated the drop, allowing the company to immediately put its most expensive exploratory projects on hold while developing new technologies such as three-dimensional seismic technology and horizontal drilling to more efficiently produce oil from mature fields and existing wells. Through the scenarios, Shell also anticipated the opening and deregulation of global markets.3s At the same time, the scenario team began to feel pressure to prove its own strategic value. The link to corporate success and the planning department's work was not quantifiable. Many managers could not fully understand the group's value. While Shell's executives acknowledged the accuracy of many of the Shell scenarios, they nevertheless saw the program as expensive and wasteful. By design, most of the scenarios developed by the group would never unfold in real life, and it was impossible to tell whether the planning department's ideas were actually having any effect on the decision-making process of management.39 For every valuable fiction scripted, there were many scenarios that would never come to pass-indeed one of the reasons that Hubbert's peak oil had been discounted was that such predictions had been made for decades beforehand- producing unrecouped expenses. Yet some scenarios proved misleading. Only a few years before, acting on the advice of scenario team, Shell entered into the nuclear and coal industries. Neither venture proved successful, both were controversial, and eventually Shell abandoned them.a0 ln 1986 de Geus began to reexamine and audit the planning department's strategies. As a result, the planning team turned toward the idea of Shell as a learning company, setting up a computer conferencing system among scenario planners while enlisting Stewart Brand, the founder of The Whole Earth Catalog, to organize a series of "learning conferences" that drew heavily from countercultural influences, cybernetics, systems theory, and computer technology. During the 1990s, the culture at large turned toward hopefulness about the impact of impendlng technological advances on the proximate future. The crisis model upon which many of the earlier scenarios depended had eased and the focus changed to seizing opportunity in emerging global markets and new technologies. So, too, as the internet made vast quantities of information easily available, it became difficult for investors to believe that anyone could produce genuinely new knowledge. Scenario planners turned inward, codifying their methodology; Peter Schwaftz. Kees van der Heijden, and Arie de Geus all released books on the methodology of scenario planning, arguing for its deployment in both professional decisions and everyday life. At this point, scenario planning was sold not as something done by a select group of remarkable people but rather as a technique that everyone could employ for personal growth and advancement, a strategy for an uncertain but rapidly expanding marketplace. There ls No Alternative Throughout the 1990s, Shell's scenarios focused on the concept "There ls No Alternative" (TINA). An echo of Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History and the Last Mani' TINA projected the increasing liberalization and globalization of markets together with a greater decline in the power of national interests and more reliance and dependence on new technology. a1 As neoliberal government policies spurred on deregulation, new financial instruments began to serve the function of scenarios, helping companies and investors guard against unforeseen conditions. Through tradable futures, options, derivatives, credit default swaps, and hedge funds, the future itself could be marketed and commodified.a2 Since 2001 , a steady stream of crises have come to pass that have radically shaken public faith in the market economy and Shell's own confidence in theTlNA concept. First, the terrorist attacks of September 11 , 2001 , growing tensions in the Middle East, and the lraq War threatened the illusion of relative peace, reliability of foreign oil supply, and free rein for globalization. Second, Shell faced scandal in 2004. Because investment depends on future returns, truthful disclosure of a company's assets is a prerequisite. Shell, however, overstated its reserves by 20 percent, prompting widespread outrage among investors.43The reality of the future undid its fiction. Combined, these threats prompted a reevaluation of TINA known as "There Are No ldeal Answers" (TANIA) to confront the need to transition to a sustainable source of energy. Scenario planning does not focus on the future but rather on the present. Peak oil, global warming, and the fragility of speculative bubbles are imminent threats. But the massive capital already invested by companies like Shell in existing infrastructure makes it impossible for them to abandon standard industry practices, even if they know that the consequences of business as usual will be dire once things hit a tipping point. Like fairy tales, scenarios present carefully crafted stories that indirectly illustrate the dangers of the world to an audience that isn't ready for them. They allow us to prepare for the future, even if we feel powerless against the forces of the world around us, by providing a context for speaking about the unspeakable. The lessons of fairy tales are gentle and distant, they may only make sense later, when the codified dangers from the stories appear in reality. This helps preserve a childlike naiveté and enables the continued drive toward pleasure in the face of fear and doubt. As Bruno Bettelheim wrote: "The figures and events of fairy tales also personify and illustrate inner conflicts, but they suggest ever so subtly how these conflicts may be solved, and what the next steps in the development toward a higher humanity might be. The fairy tale is presented in a simple, homely way; no demands are made on the listener. This prevents even the smallest child from feeling compelled to act in specific ways, and he is never made to feel inferior. Far from making demands, the fairy tale reassures, gives hope for the future, and holds out the promise of a happy ending." By providing a forum where fear and anxiety can both be discussed, fairy tales provide listeners with a sense of importance, even if they do not yet have agency.46 ln Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Sigmund Freud hypothesized that since organisms come into being from a plenum of inanimate matter, they carry with them the death drive or "pleasure principle” a desire to return to this undifferentiated state. lf, however, the organism responds with an "influx of fresh amounts of stimulus" through a traumatic event, it can awake again and go on living or, if the stimulus is strong enough, reproduce.4T In this light, scenario planning functions more as a rhetorical device and therapy than as a method of planning or accurate forecast. The shock of the actual event is necessary to allow change to occur. But scenario planning allows participants to continue playing even though they know better. Like psychoanalysis, there is no end or goal to the process of gaming; its value is the sensation that comes from playing the game.

### A2 Security Mobilizes Activism --- Securitization

#### ---Security mobilized activism is bad ---

#### (A.) Framing policies through a lens of fear causes paralysis, partying, praying or preparing, NOT the creation of preventative solutions.

Gross & Gilles 2012

Matthew Barrett, editor of the Glen Canyon Reader and media strategist who has worked for Howard Dean's 2004 presidential campaign and Jon Tester's successful campaign for U.S. Senate in Montana, Mel, writer and a former advocate for victims of domestic abuse, From “The Last Myth: What the Rise of Apocalyptic Thinking Tells Us About America,” How Apocalyptic Thinking Prevents Us from Taking Political Action, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/how-apocalyptic-thinking-prevents-us-from-taking-political-action/255758/

The deeper we entangle the challenges of the 21st century with apocalyptic fantasy, the more likely we are to paralyze ourselves with inaction -- or with the wrong course of action. We react to the idea of the apocalypse -- rather than to the underlying issues activating the apocalyptic storyline to begin with -- by either denying its reality ("global warming isn't real") or by despairing at its inevitability ("why bother recycling when the whole world is burning up?"). We react to apocalyptic threats by either partying (assuaging our apocalyptic anxiety through increased consumerism, reasoning that if it all may be gone tomorrow, we might as well enjoy it today), praying (in hopes that divine intervention or mere time will allow us to avoid confronting the challenges before us), or preparing (packing "bugout" packs for a quick escape or stocking up on gold, guns, and canned food, as though the transformative moment we anticipate will be but a brief interlude, a bad winter storm that might trap us indoors for a few days or weeks but that will eventually melt away). None of these responses avert, nor even mitigate, the very threats that have elicited our apocalyptic anxiety in the first place. Buying an electric car doesn't solve the problem of a culture dependent on endless growth in a finite world; building a bunker to defend against the zombie hordes doesn't solve the growing inequities between the rich and poor; praying for deliverance from the trials of history doesn't change that we must live in the times in which we were born. Indeed, neither partying, nor preparing, nor praying achieves what should be the natural goal when we perceive a threat on the horizon: we should not seek to ignore it, or simply brace for it, but to avert it.

#### (B.) Nationalist framing of security makes it impossible to correctly assess problems & solutions, inevitably sparking militarist intervention and war.

Massumi 2011

Brian, professor in the communication department at the University of Montreal, The half-life of disaster, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/15/half-life-of-disaster

Collective response does, of course, go on. But it takes the privileged form of a growing state security apparatus. The anti-terrorism doctrine of the US explicitly includes emergency response to natural disaster in its purview. All suddenly striking, unforeseen events that defy human logic and thus seem to substract themselves from the political sphere in its everyday functioning are lumped together in the same category, and together fall under the jurisdiction of a security apparatus that is continually growing new arms and extending old ones, weaving itself into a complex, tentacular network. The network is designed to enable seamless relay from civilian emergency response to military response. Hurricane Katrina, for example, was used by the Bush administration to break down the historical prohibition against the domestic deployment of national military force in America. A US National Guard was recalled from Iraq for service in Louisiana. When the fires were ravaging Greece in the summer of 2009, the Greek government declared the senseless, unforeseen disaster a terrorist threat, because it could not be ruled out that it had been the result of terrorist-connected arson. The army was called in. Tendencies such as these blur the boundary between the policing of civil society and the military sphere, and between natural activity, criminal activity, and acts of war. The distinction between civil society and the state of exception that is war is operationally blurred by the exercise of a "full-spectrum force" that is every much as diffuse and protean as the "threat environment" it purportedly secures. Measures suspending civil and political rights are extended and multiplied, and increasingly applied preemptively. The right to peaceful dissent suffers (witness the preemptive military-style tactics mobilised against peaceful demonstrators who had broken no law in Copenhagen at the climate talks in 2009 and at the G20 meeting in Toronto in 2010). Collective action is further restrained as the state of exception becomes the norm. The threat environment becomes an open field for autocratic intervention and arbitrary exercises of power operating on a continuum with military force. True to form, the nuclear disaster unfolding at the Fukushima reactor as a consequence of the earthquake and tsunami became "an opportunity for this pacifist nation to rely on its military at a level unseen since world war two," as the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are mobilised for civilian duty. Crucially, these developments are no longer legitimated in terms of political reason or reason of state. The blurring of the boundaries between war and peace, and the full-spectrum potential militarisation it fosters, is legitimated affectively, through the media-driven affective conversion circuit just described. In that affective logic, against the all-encompassing background of low-level fear, the tentacularly extending security apparatus appears as "natural" and as fateful as the events it is designed to respond to or preempt.

### A2 Permutation --- 2nc Politics

#### ---The permutation’s pragmatic combination fails because it still allows the debate to be framed by “energy production” which taints the affirmative’s ability to define problems and create solutions outside of existing structures of global inequality.

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012

Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

For time-pressed, slogan-bound, “must-be-ready-with-a-response” policy analysts and politicians, the invitation to reconsider such a seemingly settled concept as “energy” may look like an irksome invitation to navel-gaze. What does it matter if many societies – perhaps even the bulk of humanity – do not view a charcoal fire and a bullock drawing a plough through a field as twin instances of “energy consumption”? Far more important is the plight of the 2.7 billion people who rely on traditional biomass for cooking at the expense of forests and health; the 1.3 billion people who do not have access to electricity and thus the means to be “productive citizens”;2 the increasing competition for energy resources as the middle classes in China, India and Brazil weigh into the global mêlée for consumer goods; the need to assuage worried (Northern) consumers that the lights will not go out; and, above all, the threat that resource scarcities pose to continued economic growth. Who cares how or why fossil-fuelled capitalism is tied up with the evolution of a novel conception of energy? What matters is whether this gas pipeline should be built, that nuclear plant commissioned, or that LNG terminal financed. The pressing task is how to make the distasteful tradeoffs dictated by the realpolitik of securing energy for the future – human rights versus access to gas, maintaining jobs versus permitting pollution, leaving future generations with irresolvable problems of nuclear waste versus cutting carbon dioxide emissions. Such apparent pragmatism is understandable – but, in the end, unpragmatic. In today’s world, “energy” is about far more than pipelines and power stations, transmission lines and oil contracts: it is a system of economic and political relationships that weaves and reweaves the connections between corporations, governments, investors, human rights activists, environmentalists, the military, scientists, the media, trade unions and consumers alike into constantly shifting networks of power that serve to reproduce “the world that Energy begat”. No decision related to upper-case or abstract Energy (see pp.12ff) can escape the influences that such networks of power exert: Energy with a capital “E” not only frames the decision; it structures the solution, trapping the critical and the uncritical alike. To respond only to the daily froth of upper-case Energy talk – which power station? where? fuelled by gas or coal? – is to remain hostage to a dynamic that simply reinforces and reproduces the problems that Energy represents. Such “pragmatism” has helped shape an “energy security” agenda that mischaracterises the many energy scarcities – and insecurities – experienced by poorer people; promotes a response that has little to do with ensuring that everyone has the energy to meet their basic needs and everything to do with creating new sources of accumulation; and that disrespects the limits posed by climate change and resource depletion to endless economic growth. The result is a wave of new enclosures that, in addition to creating new scarcities (not only of energy but also of food, water, land and other necessities of life) are making a transition away from fossil fuels far harder to achieve.

#### ---Permutations themselves are a link --- The knee jerk reaction to combine fundamentally opposed positions into one happy consensus and replaces the antagonisms constitutive of political space with the vacuous notion of a “best policy option.” Permutations can only steamroll true politics because in its rush to include everything, it leaves no space for opposition or dissensus.

Swyngedouw 2009

Erik, Geography @ School of Environment and Development Manchester University, Climate Change as Post-Political and Post-Democratic Populism, Paper presented at DVPW conference, Kiel, Germany, 22-25 September

Consensually established concerns, like climate change, structured around ecologies of fear -- threats that may ultimately undermine the co-ordinates of daily life – and sustained by a universalising populist discourse express and sustain the deepening of a post-political condition. The latter is, in turn, institutionalised through forms of post-democratic governing. Post-politics is marked by the predominance of a managerial logic in all aspects of life, the reduction of the political to administration where decision-making is increasingly considered to be a question of expert knowledge and not of political position. It is accompanied by the diffusion of governance into a host of non-state or quasi-state institutional forms and actors, and fosters consensual understandings of political action and the particularization of political demands. Post-politics refers to a politics in which ideological or dissensual contestation and struggles are replaced by techno-managerial planning, expert management and administration, “whereby the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives is the primary goal” (Žižek, 1999). Whereas the proper democratic political recognizes the constitutive split of the people, the inherent antagonisms and heterogeneities that cut through the social, while presuming the quality of each and everyone qua speaking beings, the post-political disavows these antagonisms by displacing conflict and disagreement on to the terrain of consensually manageable problems, expert knowledge, and interest intermediation (Swyngedouw, 2009a). ‘Doing politics’ is reduced to a form of institutionalized social management and to the mobilization of governmental technologies where difficulties and problems are dealt with by administrative and techno-organizational means (Nancy, cited in (Marchart, 2007: 68). In other words, politics as policy-makings (la politique) have sutured the space of the political as expressions of disagreement/dissensus (le politique) (Dikeç, 2005). Such post-political arrangement signals a depoliticised (in the sense of the disappearance of the democratic agonistic struggle over the content and direction of socio-ecological life) public space whereby adminsistrative governance defines the zero-level of politics (see (Marquand, 2004) (Swyngedouw, 2009d)). Proper political choice as the agonistic confrontation of competing visions of different socio-ecological order is foreclosed as the spaces of the political or sutured by totalising threats that permit only one choice or direction, one that can be ‘managed’ through dialogical consensual practices (Mouffe, 2005). Post-politics reject ideological divisions and the explicit universalisation of particular political demands (Žižek, 1999: 198). Post-politics is thus about the administration (policing) of social, economic, ecological or other issues, and they remain of course fully within the realm of the possible, of existing social relations, they are ‘the partition of the sensible’ (Rancière, 2001). “The ultimate sign of post-politics in all Western countries”, (Žižek, 2002: 303) argues, “is the growth of a managerial approach to government: government is reconceived as a managerial function, deprived of its proper political dimension”. “In post-politics, the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists …) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus. Post-politics thus emphasizes the need to leave old ideological visions behind and confront new issues, armed with the necessary expert knowledge and free deliberation that takes people’s concrete needs and demands into account” (Žižek, 1999: 198). “The political (the space of litigation in which the excluded can protest the wrong/injustice done to them), [is] foreclosed … It is crucial to perceive … the post-political suspension of the political in the reduction of the state to a mere police agent servicing the (consensually established) needs of the market forces and multiculturalist tolerant humanitarianism” (Žižek, 2006b: 72). Post-politics refuses politicization in the classical Greek sense, that is, as the metaphorical universalization of particular demands, which aims at “more” than negotiation of interests. Politics becomes something one can do without making decisions that divide and separate (Thomson, 2003). Difficulties and problems, which are generally staged and accepted as problematic, have to be dealt with by means of compromise and the production of consensus. The key feature of consensus is “the annulment of dissensus ….. the ‘end of politics’” (Rancière, 2001: §32). Of course, this post-political world eludes choice and freedom (other than those tolerated by the consensus) and effaces the proper political from the spaces of public encounter. For Rancière, this disavowal of the political and the staging of politics as a form of consensual management of the givens of the situation as one of the tactics through which spaces of conflict and antagonism are smoothened and displaced (Rancière, 1998). This ‘re-treat of the political’ (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, 1997) and its replacement by consensual policing arrangements is organised through post-democratic institutions of governance, like the Kyoto protocol and other public-private bodies, that increasingly replace the political institutions of government (see (Crouch, 2004)). Post-democratic institutional arrangements are the performative expression of a post-political condition. For Rancière (Rancière, 1998: 102), “Postdemocracy is … a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, the miscount, and dispute of the people and is thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of social energies and interests.” Urbaniti defines these post-democratic institutions of ‘governance-beyond-the-state’ (see (Swyngedouw, 2005)) as follows: “Governance entails an explicit reference to ‘mechanisms’ or ‘organized’ and ‘coordinated activities’ appropriate to the solution of some specific problems. Unlike government, governance refers to ‘policies’ rather than ‘politics’ … . Its recipients are not ‘the people’ as collective political subject, but ‘the population’ that can be affected by global issues such as the environment, migration, or the use of natural resources” ((Urbinati, 2003: 80), cited in (Mouffe, 2005)). This post-democratic constitution reconfigures the act of governing to a stakeholder based arrangement of multi-scalar governance in which the traditional state forms partake together with experts, NGOs, and other ‘responsible’ partners (while ‘irresponsible’ partners are excluded). They operate with a generally accepted consensus of a global and largely (neo-)liberal capitalism, the right of individual choice, an ecological awareness and the necessity to continue this, to sustain the state of the situation (that is allegedly in serious danger). Discussion and dispute are tolerated, even encouraged, in so far the general frame is not contested. Not only are radical dissent, critique, and fundamental conflict evacuated from the political arena (and relegated to the terrain of ‘extra-political’ and unauthorised violence), but the parameters of democratic governing itself are being shifted, announcing new forms of governmentality, in which traditional disciplinary society is transfigured into a society of control through democratically disembedded networks (like ‘the Kyoto Protocol’; ‘the Dublin Statement’, the ‘Rio Summit’, etc….). Conclusion: re-thinking the political environment “Against thoughts of the end and catastrophe, I believe it is possible and necessary to oppose a thought of political precariousness” (Rancière, 2004: 8). We have argued that the particular framing of climate change and its associated populist politics as outlined above foreclose (or at least attempt to do so) politicization and evacuates dissent through the formation of a particular regimes of environmental governance that revolves around consensus, agreement, participatory negotiation of different interests, and technocratic expert management in the context of a non-disputed management of market-based socio-economic organization. Even a cursory analysis of ‘green politics’, whether from the perspective of environmental movements (like Greenpeace) or environmental parties (the German Greens are a classic case), over the past few decades would signal their rapid transformation from engaging in a politics of contestation, organized acting, radical disagreement, and developing visionary alternatives to their integration into stakeholder based negotiation arrangements aimed at delivering a negotiated policy. A consensual post-politics emerges here, one that either eliminates fundamental conflict or elevates it to antithetical ultra-politics. The consensual times we are currently living in have thus eliminated a genuine political space of disagreement. These post-political climate change policies rest on the following foundations. First, the social and ecological problems caused by modernity/capitalism are external side-effects; they are not an inherent and integral part of the relations of liberal politics and capitalist economies. Second, a strictly populist politics emerges here; one that elevates the interest of an imaginary ‘the People’, Nature, or ‘the environment’ to the level of the universal rather than opening spaces that permit to universalize the claims of particular socio-natures, environments, or social groups or classes. Third, these side-effects are constituted as global, universal, and threatening. Fourth, the ‘enemy’ or the target of concern is continuously externalized and becomes socially disembodied, is always vague, ambiguous, unnamed and uncounted, and ultimately empty. Fifth, the target of concern can be managed through a consensual dialogical politics whereby demands become depoliticized and politics naturalized within a given socio-ecological order for which there is ostensibly no real alternative (Swyngedouw, 2007). The post-political environmental consensus, therefore, is one that is radically reactionary, one that forestalls the articulation of divergent, conflicting, and alternative trajectories of future socio-environmental possibilities and of human-human and human-nature articulations and assemblages. It holds on to a harmonious view of nature that can be recaptured while re-producing if not solidifying a liberal-capitalist order for which there seems to be no alternative. Much of the sustainability argument has evacuated the politics of the possible, the radical contestation of alternative future socio-environmental possibilities and socio-natural arrangements, and silences the antagonisms and conflicts that are constitutive of our socio-natural orders by externalising conflict. It is inherently reactionary. As Badiou (Badiou, 2005) argues, ‘proper’ politics must revolve around the construction of great new fictions that create real possibilities for constructing different socio-environmental futures. To the extent that the current post-political condition that combines apocalyptic environmental visions with a hegemonic neoliberal view of social ordering constitutes one particular fiction (one that in fact forecloses dissent, conflict, and the possibility of a different future), there is an urgent need for different stories and fictions that can be mobilised for realisation. This requires foregrounding and naming different socio-environmental futures and recognizing conflict, difference, and struggle over the naming and trajectories of these futures. Socio-environmental conflict, therefore, should not be subsumed under the homogenizing mantle of a populist environmentalist-sustainability discourse, but should be legitimised as constitutive of a democratic order. This, of course, turns the climate question into a question of democracy and its meaning. It asserts the horizon of a recuperated democracy as the terrain (space) for expressing conflict, for nurturing agonistic debate and disagreement, and, most importantly, for the naming different possible socio-environmental futures.